



ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION AGENDA

Date: **Monday, May 19, 2025**

Time: 6:30 P.M.

Place: **Antioch City Hall – Council Chambers**
200 H Street
Antioch, CA 94509

ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSIONERS

Porshe Taylor, Chairperson
Devin Williams, Vice Chairperson
Treva Hadden
Alicia Dianne Lacey-Oha
Lisa Elekwachi
Susan Kennedy
Joseph Mitchell

Staff Liaison: Bessie Marie Scott, City Manager
Kevin W. Kunder, Assistant City Attorney
Joseph Vigil, Police Chief

Commission meetings are live streamed at:
<https://www.antiochca.gov/government/boards-commissions/#section-apoc>.

Please see the inside cover for detailed Speaker Rules.

ACCESSIBILITY: In accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act and California law, it is the policy of the City of Antioch to offer its public programs, services and meetings in a manner that is readily accessible to everyone, including individuals with disabilities. If you are a person with a disability and require information or materials in an appropriate alternative format; or if you require any other accommodation, please contact the ADA Coordinator at the number or address below at least 72 hours prior to the meeting or when you desire to receive services. Advance notification within this guideline will enable the City to make reasonable arrangements to ensure accessibility. The City's ADA Coordinator can be reached @ Phone: (925) 779-6950, and e-mail: publicworks@antiochca.gov.

PLEASE TURN OFF CELL PHONES BEFORE ENTERING MEETING LOCATION.

ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION

SPEAKER RULES

Welcome to the Antioch Police Oversight Commission meeting. The Commission encourages community participation. The Ralph M. Brown Act guarantees the public's right to address the Commission, within the framework of Speaker Rules. Because agendas encompass many business items, Speaker Rules enable the meeting to be efficiently conducted and concluded at a reasonable hour.

How to submit a Public Comment – Members of the public wishing to provide public comments, may do so one of the following ways:

- 1) **Written Public Comment** – Written comments may be submitted electronically to the City Clerk at the following email address: cityclerk@antiochca.gov, *prior to 3:00 p.m. the day of the Commission Meeting*. Please indicate the agenda item in your email subject line. Written public comments received before 3:00 p.m., the day of the meeting, will be provided to the Commissioners before the meeting.
- 2) **In Person** – Please fill out a Speaker Request Form, available near the entrance doors, and place it in the Speaker Card Tray near the City Clerk before the meeting begins. Speakers will be notified shortly before they are called to speak. When you are called to speak, please limit your comments to the time allotted (up to 3 minutes). If there are several speakers, the amount of time allotted may be modified at the Chairperson's discretion.

Record of all public comments – *All public comments will become part of the official public record and subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act. All public comments will be retained on file by the City Clerk's Office; entered into the official meeting record and will be available to the public upon request. Written public comments will not be read during the Commission Meeting.*

Notice of Availability of Reports

The Antioch Police Oversight Commission will meet regularly on the first and third Mondays of the month at 6:30 p.m. (except during the months of July and December when regular meetings shall occur once per month). The Antioch Police Oversight Commission Agendas are posted onto the City's Website 72 hours before each meeting. To be notified when the agenda packets are posted onto our City's Website, simply click on this link: <https://www.antiochca.gov/notifications/> and enter your e-mail address to subscribe. To view the agenda information, please click on the following link: <https://www.antiochca.gov/government/boards-commissions/#section-apoc>.

ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION'S PURPOSE

The purpose of the Commission is to advise the City Council, City Manager, and Chief of Police on the administration of the Antioch Police Department and on matters of public safety within the City of Antioch to ensure that the Antioch Police Department's policies, practices, and customs conform to national standards of constitutional policing. [Ordinance No. 2212-C-S, adopted May 24, 2022: <https://www.antiochca.gov/fc/posc/posc-ord-2212.pdf>].

NOTICE OF OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION

This agenda is a summary of the discussion items/actions proposed to be taken by the Antioch Police Oversight Commission. The public has the opportunity to address the Commission on each agenda item. The Commission can only take action on items that are listed on the agenda. Comments regarding matters not on this Agenda may be addressed during the "Public Comments" section on this agenda. No one may speak more than once on an agenda item or during "Public Comments". Please see the Speaker Rules on the inside cover of this Agenda for information on public participation.

AGENDA

1. CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL

2. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

3. CONSENT CALENDAR

Consent Calendar items are considered routine and will be enacted by one motion. By approval of the Consent Calendar, the staff recommendations will be adopted unless a commissioner or a member of the public requests' removal of an item from the Consent Calendar.

3-1. ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION MEETING MINUTES OF APRIL 21, 2025

Recommended Action: It is recommended that the Antioch Police Oversight Commission approve the Meeting Minutes of April 21, 2025.

3-2. ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION MEETING MINUTES OF MAY 5, 2025

Recommended Action: It is recommended that the Antioch Police Oversight Commission continue the Meeting Minutes of May 5, 2025, to the next meeting.

4. PUBLIC HEARING

4-1. REVIEW OF THE ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT'S PROPOSED BUDGET AND ADVISE WHETHER BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS FOR THE POLICE DEPARTMENT ARE ALIGNED WITH THE POLICE DEPARTMENT'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AS REQUIRED BY ANTIOCH MUNICIPAL CODE SECTION 4-3.110(D)

- A.** Staff Presentation
- B.** Public Comment
- C.** Commission Discussion
- D.** Recommended Action: It is recommended that the Antioch Police Oversight Commission (APOC) review the Antioch Police Department's proposed budget and forward to the City Council any recommendations for change.

5. NEW BUSINESS

5-1. POLICE CHIEF JOSEPH VIGIL'S REPORT

The Police Chief (or designee) will provide an update on information relevant to the mission, purpose, and work of the Antioch Police Oversight Commission.

- A.** Police Department Updates
- B.** National Public Safety Partnership Program
- C.** Public Comment
- D.** Commission Discussion and Direction

5-2. DISCUSSION ON THE SELECTION OF TWO FUTURE COMMISSION MEETING DATES TO CONDUCT TWO COMMISSION MEETINGS AT A LOCATION OTHER THAN CITY HALL

- A.** Staff Presentation
- B.** Public Comment
- C.** Commission Discussion
- D.** Recommended Action: It is recommended that the Antioch Police Oversight Commission discuss and select two future Commission meeting dates to conduct two Commission meetings at a location(s) other than City Hall.

6. PUBLIC COMMENTS

Members of the public are given the opportunity to address the Commission on an item that is not on the agenda; up to three (3) minutes. If there are several speakers, the amount of time allotted may be modified at the Chairperson's discretion.

7. AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT OUT

The ad hoc committee members will provide updates on their committee's work and plans for the future.

8. UPCOMING/ FUTURE AGENDA ITEMS

The Commission will engage in a working session to discuss and determine agenda items for the upcoming Commission meeting, and to agree on a list of agenda items to be discussed on future agendas. The Commission will work on creating a list of agenda items for future meetings.

9. ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSIONER REPORT OUT

(3 minutes per commissioner)

Each commissioner will have an opportunity to provide an update on information relevant to the mission, purpose, and work of the Antioch Police Oversight Commission.

10. STAFF COMMUNICATIONS

Staff may provide an update on information relevant to the mission, purpose, and work of the Antioch Police Oversight Commission.

11. NEXT MEETING DATE – June 2, 2025, at 6:30 p.m.

12. ADJOURNMENT

After Staff Communications, the Chairperson/Vice Chairperson will make a motion to adjourn the meeting. A second motion is required, and then a majority vote is required to adjourn the meeting.

**CITY OF ANTIOCH
ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION
REGULAR MEETING**

**Regular Meeting
6:30 P.M.**

**April 21, 2025
City Council Chambers**

1. CALL TO ORDER AND ROLL CALL

Chairperson Taylor called the meeting to order at 6:31 P.M. on Monday, April 21, 2025, in Council Chambers. Acting City Clerk Rosales called the roll.

Present: Commissioners Kennedy, Lacey-Oha, Hadden, Vice Chairperson Williams and Chairperson Taylor

Absent: Commissioner Elekwachi

Staff: City Manager, Bessie Marie Scott
Police Chief, Joseph Vigil
Assistant City Attorney, Kevin Kunding
Acting City Clerk, Vanessa Rosales
Assistant City Clerk, Christina Garcia

2. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

Chairperson Taylor led the Pledge of Allegiance.

3. DISCUSSION ITEM: OVERVIEW OF THE ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION ORDINANCE

Assistant City Attorney Kunding presented the staff report dated April 21, 2025, recommending the Antioch Police Oversight Commission receive and file the presentation.

The Commission received public comment from the following individual who spoke on the Overview of the Antioch Police Oversight Commission Ordinance presentation: Leslie May.

City Manager Scott, Assistant City Attorney Kunding and Police Chief Vigil provided responses to inquiries from the APOC regarding the Overview of the Antioch Police Oversight Commission Ordinance presentation.

In response to the Commission, City Manager Scott stated that Police Chief Vigil could deliver presentations on topics such as mutual aid, hate crime response, and the criteria used to prioritize police calls.

4. CONSENT CALENDAR

4-1 ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION MEETING MINUTES OF MARCH 17, 2025

4-2 ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION MEETING MINUTES OF APRIL 7, 2025 – NO QUORUM

On motion by Commissioner Williams, seconded by Commissioner Kennedy the Antioch Police Oversight Commission members present unanimously approved the Consent Calendar.

5. NEW BUSINESS

5-1 POLICE CHIEF JOSEPH VIGIL’S REPORT

A. POLICE DEPARTMENT UPDATES

Police Chief Vigil gave the Police Department Staffing Update presentation.

B. IA PRESENTATION

Police Chief Vigil gave the Internal Affairs Investigations – Yearly Report 2024 presentation and provided responses to inquiries from the APOC regarding the presentation.

On motion by Commissioner Williams, seconded by Commissioner Kennedy the Antioch Police Oversight Commission members present unanimously declared a recess at 7:26 P.M.

The meeting reconvened at 7:31 P.M. with all Commissioners present with the exception of Commissioners Elekwachi and Williams who were absent.

C. TRAINING

Police Chief Vigil gave the Training presentation.

D. PSP PROGRAM

Police Chief Vigil gave the Public Safety Partnership (PSP) presentation and provided responses to inquiries from the APOC regarding the program.

E. PUBLIC COMMENT – None

F. COMMISSION DISCUSSION AND DIRECTION – None

5-2. RESTRUCTURING OF AD HOC COMMITTEES AND MEMBERSHIP

Chairperson Taylor presented New Business Agenda Item 5-2 recommending the Antioch Police Oversight Commission adopt the resolution to restructure and combine the following ad hoc committees: 1) Policy, 2) Use of Force and 3) Complaints, Internal Affairs and Hiring Process to “Police Practices” Ad Hoc Committee for a term of 12 months.

Commissioner Kennedy supported the recommended action and volunteered to participate in the Ad Hoc Committee.

The Commission received public comments from the following individuals who spoke on the Restructuring of Ad Hoc Committees and Membership: Leslie May and Nichole Gardner.

Assistant City Attorney Kunding responded to inquiries from the Public on the Restructuring of Ad Hoc Committees and Membership presentation.

A motion was made by Commissioner Kennedy, seconded by Commissioner Lacey-Oha to dissolve the existing Ad Hoc Committees and adopt the resolution. The motion failed by the following vote:

Ayes: Kennedy, Lacey-Oha, Taylor Abstain: Hadden Absent: Williams, Elekwachi

Commissioner Hadden requested this agenda item be moved to a future agenda so that she could review the information provided.

On motion by Commissioner Lacey-Oha, seconded by Commissioner Kennedy the Antioch Police Oversight Commission members present unanimously tabled the Restructuring of Ad Hoc Committees and Membership item to a future agenda.

6. PUBLIC COMMENTS

The Commission received general public comment from: Nichole Gardner.

7. AD HOC COMMITTEE REPORT OUT

Chairperson Taylor reported the Lexipol Policy Ad Hoc Committee would resume meeting on April 24, 2025, and they were more than 50% done with the rewrite

8. UPCOMING/ FUTURE AGENDA ITEMS

Discussion ensued regarding the APOC members' priorities for future agenda items.

Commissioner Kennedy requested the following future agenda items: APD Budget Public Hearing and Angelo Quinto Crisis Response Team (AQCRT) and Dispatch Presentations. She stated she would like to discuss the impact of Executive Order 14168 with City Manager Scott and Assistant City Attorney Kunding.

Chairperson Taylor suggested the Community Engagement Ad Hoc Committee consider drafting forms to educate the public on information that should be provided when calling dispatch.

Commissioner Lacey-Oha requested a presentation on Mutual Aid.

Chairperson Taylor informed Commissioner Kennedy that she was the only Commissioner on the Budget Ad Hoc Committee and if she were interested in serving on that committee, there may be an opportunity to add members.

The Commission received public comment from the following individuals who spoke on Upcoming/Future Agenda items: Nichole Gardner and Leslie May.

Commission consensus for the following priority requests included:

- Ad Hoc Committee Restructuring
- Encampment Sweeps Presentation
- Mutual Aid Police Presentation
- AQCRT Presentation

9. ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSIONER REPORT OUT

Commissioner Kennedy reported on her attendance at the Bunny Hop event.

Commissioner Lacey-Oha commended the APD for their response to a break in that had occurred in her home. She acknowledged the passing of Pope Francis.

Chairperson Taylor welcomed Commissioners Kennedy and Elekwachi and congratulated Police Chief Vigil on being appointed permanent Police Chief.

The Commission received public comment from the following individuals who spoke on Antioch Police Oversight Commissioner Report Out: Nichole Gardner and Joe Mitchell.

Commissioner Kennedy suggested the APOC consider identifying trusted messengers.

Chairperson Taylor agreed with identifying community stakeholders to expand community engagement.

10. STAFF COMMUNICATIONS

Acting Police Chief Vigil announced Neighborhood Clean Up events take place on the first Saturday of every month alternating locations between Rivertown and Southeast Antioch.

11. NEXT MEETING DATE – May 5, 2025, at 6:30 P.M.

Chairperson Taylor announced the next APOC meeting would be held at 6:30 P.M. on May 5, 2025.

12. ADJOURNMENT

On motion by Commissioner Kennedy, seconded by Commissioner Lacey-Oha the Antioch Police Oversight Commission members present unanimously adjourned at 8:11 P.M.

Respectfully submitted:

Kitty Eiden

KITTY EIDEN, Minutes Clerk



STAFF REPORT TO THE ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION

DATE: Regular Meeting of May 19, 2025

TO: Honorable Chairperson and Members of the Antioch Police Oversight Commission

SUBMITTED BY: Melissa Rhodes, City Clerk
Christina Garcia, CMC, Assistant City Clerk *Cg*

SUBJECT: Antioch Police Oversight Commission Meeting Minutes of May 5, 2025

RECOMMENDED ACTION

It is recommended that the Antioch Police Oversight Commission continue the Meeting Minutes of May 5, 2025, to the next meeting.

FISCAL IMPACT

None

DISCUSSION

N/A

ATTACHMENT

None.

APD BUDGET PRESENTATION




PUBLIC HEARING
Monday, May 19th, 2025

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT STAFFING

	Allocated Positions In 2025 Budget	Allocated Positions In 2026 & 2027 Budget	Vacant as of 5/19/25
Police Chief	1	1	0
Captain	2	3	1
Lieutenant	6	6	2
Sergeant	11	12	2
Corporal	7	7	4
Officers	88	88	19
Community Service Officers	13	13	5
Communications Supervisor	1	1	0
Records Supervisor	1	1	0
Property and Evidence Supervisor	1	1	0
Crime Analyst	2	2	0
Dispatcher Lead	4	4	0
Dispatcher	11	11	3
Lead Police Records Technician	2	2	0
Police Records Technician	7	7	2
Administrative Analyst	3	4	0
Grand Total	162	165	38

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

2024 – 2025 BUDGET (REVISED)



ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE DEPARTMENT SUMMARY

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
USE OF FUNDS:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$42,897,885	\$46,698,007	\$48,589,258
Services & Supplies	14,094,641	11,721,500	11,612,004
Transfers Out	2,266,306	2,901,616	3,027,019
Total Use of Funds	\$59,258,832	\$61,321,123	\$63,228,281

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE DEPARTMENT ADMIN (100-3110)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$5,304,940	\$4,928,465	\$5,070,797
Supplies	308,500	331,425	331,425
Safety Materials	1,125,000	1,144,000	1,144,000
Contracts	1,300,000	1,704,250	1,254,250
Contracts – REACH	205,000	205,000	205,000
Vehicle Maint/Replacement	15,396	19,916	19,916
Computer/Phone Maint. & Replace	876,180	881,039	884,043
Business Expense	860,200	876,250	876,250
Total Use of Funds	\$9,995,216	\$9,732,845	\$9,765,681

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE COMPLIANCE & PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (100-3115)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$0	\$1,305,470	\$1,327,350
Supplies	0	150,000	150,000
Contracts	85,000	250,000	250,000
Business Expense	0	210,000	210,000
Total Use of Funds	\$85,000	\$1,915,470	\$1,937,350

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE CADETS (100-3120)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$2,156	\$2,156	\$2,156
Explorers	10,000	10,000	10,000
Total Use of Funds	\$12,156	\$12,156	\$12,156

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE PRISONER CUSTODY (100-3130)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$493,453	\$521,579	\$537,488
Supplies	3,000	3,000	3,000
Computer/Phone Maint. & Replace	14,070	14,070	14,070
Total Use of Funds	\$510,523	\$538,649	\$554,558

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE COMMUNITY POLICING (100-3150)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$28,290,012	\$26,683,677	\$28,066,136
Supplies	409,500	409,500	409,500
Contracts	682,000	778,300	778,300
Vehicle Maint/Replacement	1,169,223	722,467	722,467
Computer/Phone Maint. & Replace	11,848	11,848	11,848
Business Expense	17,000	17,000	17,000
Furniture & Equipment	1,137,962	0	0
Total Use of Funds	\$31,717,545	\$28,622,792	\$30,005,251

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE TRAFFIC (100-3160)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$1,212,032	\$2,164,405	\$2,191,551
Supplies	47,683	32,000	32,000
Vehicle Maint/Replacement	27,279	17,586	17,586
Total Use of Funds	\$1,286,994	\$2,213,991	\$2,241,137

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE INVESTIGATIONS (100-3170)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$4,019,967	\$5,466,728	\$5,571,132
Supplies	120,000	71,000	71,000
Contracts	812,608	1,102,700	1,102,700
Vehicle Maint/Replacement	80,781	34,674	34,674
Computer/Phone Maint. & Replace	20,735	20,735	20,735
Business Expense	5,000	8,000	8,000
Furniture & Equipment	49,969	0	0
Total Use of Funds	\$5,109,060	\$6,703,837	\$6,808,241

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS (100-3175)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$480,210	\$1,163,358	\$1,178,398
Supplies	56,000	41,000	41,000
Contracts	60,000	60,000	60,000
Vehicle Maint/Replacement	12,845	1,462	1,462
Business Expense	1,000	1,000	1,000
Total Use of Funds	\$610,055	\$1,266,820	\$1,281,860

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE COMMUNICATIONS (100-3180)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$3,035,080	\$4,402,134	\$4,584,215
Supplies	18,000	18,000	18,000
Contracts	930,000	950,000	950,000
Computer/Phone Maint. & Replace	422,740	422,740	422,740
Business Expense	35,000	35,000	35,000
Furniture & Equipment	230,812	500,000	500,000
Total Use of Funds	\$4,671,632	\$6,327,874	\$6,509,955

**ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT
POLICE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT (100-3185)**

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Supplies	\$2,585	\$2,585	\$2,585
Contracts	190,000	125,000	125,000
Computer/Phone Maint. & Replace	14,810	14,810	14,810
Business Expense	5,063	5,000	5,000
Total Use of Funds	\$212,458	\$147,395	\$147,395

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE COMMUNITY VOLUNTEERS (100-3195)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$60,035	\$60,035	\$60,035
Supplies	10,300	10,300	10,300
Vehicle Maint/Replacement	5,476	1,619	1,619
Business Expense	1,300	1,300	1,300
Total Use of Funds	\$77,111	\$73,254	\$73,254

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE FACILITIES MAINTENANCE (100-3200)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Parts & Service	\$138,990	\$138,990	\$138,990
Contracts	344,319	300,000	300,000
Computer/Phone Maint. & Replace	4,444	4,444	4,444
Utilities	411,990	411,990	411,990
Business Expense	9,000	9,000	9,000
Furniture & Equipment	1,756,033	0	0
Total Use of Funds	\$2,664,776	\$864,424	\$864,424

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE ANIMAL CONTROL SUPPORT (100-3320)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Use of Funds:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Furniture & Equipment	\$40,000	\$0	\$0
Transfer Out to Animal Control	2,266,306	2,901,616	3,027,019
Total Use of Funds	\$2,306,306	\$2,901,616	\$3,027,019

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

POLICE ANIMAL SERVICES (FUND 214)

	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27
Expenditures:	Revised	Proposed	Proposed
Personnel	\$1,813,986	\$2,332,680	\$2,444,200
Services & Supplies	747,615	803,936	817,819
Total Expenditures	\$2,561,601	\$3,136,616	\$3,262,019

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS

PROPOSED	APPROVED
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Dispatch Center (\$1.5 Million)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Parking Paving (\$80,000)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Property/Evidence Building (\$150,000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Investigations Remodel (\$85,000)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Records Remodel (\$70,000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Emergency Operations Center (\$480,000)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Radio Tower (\$303,000)

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT CONSULTANTS

- Chaplain Hill (\$60,000)
- Cold Pro Media (\$75,000)
- Giordano Consulting (\$42,000)
- WBA Consultant (\$285,000)
- Crisis MC 911 (\$45,000)
- Navigating Preparedness Associates (\$65,000)
- Public Safety Family Counseling (\$75,000)


ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT

CRIME STATS 2022-2024

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS	2022	2023	2024	% Change 2023-2024
HOMICIDE	9	10	16	60%
RAPES	43	33	37	12%
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	513	436	506	16%
OFFENSES AGAINST PERSONS	565	520	559	8%
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY		2023	2024	% Change 2023-2024
ROBBERY	166	211	241	14%
BURGLARY	428	558	546	-2%
THEFT*	1480	1647	1714	4%
AUTO THEFT	650	1244	1682	35%
ARSON	16	8	12	50%
OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY	2740	3668	4195	14%

***Online reports stopped being transmitted to RMS on 11/13/2024**

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT CALLS FOR SERVICE/CASES 2023/2024



AQCRT CALL DATA 2023-2024

CATEGORY	2023	2024
CARE TEAM CALLS*	3231	6272
CARE TEAM CALLS W/ PD	542	964
PERCENTAGE OF PD ASSIST CALLS	17%	15%

* Does not include calls refused by AQCRT

TOP 10 CALL TYPES

2023		2024	
CALL/COMPLAINT TYPE	TOTAL	CALL/COMPLAINT TYPE	TOTAL
Welfare Check	771	Welfare Check	1840
Unwanted Guest	381	Music Complaint	755
Public Nuisance	295	Unwanted Guest	724
Music Complaint	216	Public Nuisance	397
Mental Health Incident	160	Mental Health Incident	262
Antioch Muni Code Violation	145	Antioch Muni Code Violation	240
Suspicious Person	130	Loitering Complaint	213
Trespassing	115	Party Complaint	193
Loitering Complaint	111	Service to Citizen	151
Verbal Dispute	108	Suspicious Person	130

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT BIGGEST CHALLENGES

- Hiring, Recruiting, and Retention of Employees
- Officer Development
- Continual Office/Workspace Expansion
(South Substation)
- Integrating state-of-the-art tools and systems

ANTIOCH POLICE DEPARTMENT SUCCESSION PLAN

- Sunsetting Hiring bonus for new officers
- Phased in hiring approach

CITY OF ANTIOCH
ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Antioch Police Oversight Commission will hold a public hearing in the **CITY COUNCIL CHAMBERS, City Hall, 200 H Street at 6:30 P.M. or thereafter on MONDAY, MAY 19, 2025**, on the following matter:

Review of the Antioch Police Department's Proposed Budget and advise whether budgetary allocations for the Police Department are aligned with the Police Department's policies and procedures as required by Antioch Municipal Code § 4-3.110(D)

Members of the public wishing to provide public comments may do so in one of the following ways:

- 1. IN PERSON** – Fill out a Speaker Request Form, available near the entrance doors, and place in the Speaker Card Tray near the City Clerk before the meeting begins.
- 2. WRITTEN PUBLIC COMMENT** – If you wish to provide a written public comment, please email the City Clerk's Department at cityclerk@antiochca.gov **by 3:00 p.m. the day of the Antioch Police Oversight Commission Meeting.**

*Please note: Written public comments received **by 3:00 p.m. the day of the Antioch Police Oversight Commission Meeting** will be shared with the Commissioners before the meeting, entered into the public record, retained on file by the City Clerk's Office, and available to the public upon request. Written public comments will not be read during the meeting.*

If any person challenges the decision of the City in these matters in court, they may be limited to raising only those issues that were raised at the public hearing described in this notice, or in written correspondence, delivered to the City at, or prior to, the public hearing.

Copies of the documents relating to this report are available for review at the City Attorney's Department during business hours of Monday through Thursday, 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. If you have any specific questions concerning these documents, you may contact the City Attorney's Department at cityattorney@antiochca.gov. Written statements in favor of or in opposition to this matter, may be emailed to: cityclerk@antiochca.gov, or mailed to the City Clerk's Office, City Hall, 200 "H" Street (P.O. Box 5007), Antioch, CA 94531-5007, prior to the hearing.

ACCESSIBILITY: In accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act and California law, it is the policy of the City of Antioch to offer its public programs, services and meetings in a manner that is readily accessible to everyone, including individuals with disabilities. If you are a person with a disability and require information or materials in an appropriate alternative format; or if you require any other accommodation, please contact the ADA Coordinator at the number or address below at least 72 hours prior to the meeting or when you desire to receive services. Advance notification within this guideline will enable the City to make reasonable arrangements to ensure accessibility. The City's ADA Coordinator can be reached @ Phone: (925) 779-6950, and e-mail: publicworks@antiochca.gov.

/s/ MELISSA RHODES
MELISSA RHODES, City Clerk

ECT 6894171 May 9, 2025

2001228

/ANTIOCH, CITY OF
ATTN:ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
PO BOX 5007
ANTIOCH, CA 94531-5007

PROOF OF PUBLICATION

**FILE NO. 5/19 Hearing-Police Oversight
Commiss.**

East County Times

I am a citizen of the United States. I am over the age of eighteen years and I am not a party to or interested in the above entitled matter. I am the Legal Advertising Clerk of the printer and publisher of the East County Times, a newspaper published in the English language in the City of Antioch, County of Contra Costa, State of California.

I declare that the East County Times is a newspaper of general circulation as defined by the laws of the State of California as determined by court decree dated January 6, 1919, Case Number 8268 and modified January 19, 2006, Case Number N05-1494. Said decree states that the East County Times is adjudged to be a newspaper of general circulation for the City of Antioch, County of Contra Costa and State of California. Said order has not been revoked.

I declare that the notice, of which the annexed is a printed copy, has been published in each regular and entire issue of said newspaper and not in any supplement thereof on the following dates, to wit:

05/09/2025

I certify (or declare) under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Walnut Creek, California.
On this 9th day of May, 2025.



Signature



STRATEGIC PLAN AT-A-GLANCE **ANTIOCH**

LONG-TERM STRATEGIC OUTCOME

The Antioch Police Department is committed to reducing violent crime by strengthening public safety partnerships, and engaging community stakeholders, to identify and address the circumstances that contribute to violent crime in Antioch. It is our goal to create a Public Safety Network (PSN), comprised of Criminal Justice agencies and community members, committed to building a model community identity, sustainable and tailored evidence-based violence reduction strategies, and data-driven solutions that leverage innovative technologies.

Goal 1:

Identifying Criminal Justice agencies to build and participate in a Public Safety Network in efforts to: Define violent crime, engage in violent crime analysis, tailor intervention services & support, focus enforcement on violence drivers, and increase case clearances and prosecutions.

Champion:

Lieutenant Desmond Bittner
Sergeant Matt Koch

Strategies:

1.1: Antioch PD, together with the USAO, to identify federal partners to participate in the PSN with a focus on reducing violent crime, gun-crime, returning violent crime offenders, and crime perpetrated by violent gang members. Educate and highlight the best-practices for the federal prosecution of cases involving local operations and investigations.

1.2: Establish PSN monthly meetings with local, state, and federal partners (justice partners) using data-sharing and data-analysis that maximizes the capabilities of our partners.

1.3: Identify key participants to enhance the analytical capacity and the intelligence-sharing of the Public Safety Network (PSN).

1.4: Establish a process where patrol officers can contribute to

Expected Outcomes:

- Increase federal filing case referrals (quality local cases). Improved communication & local department training.
- Identify and increase participation in collaborative partnerships increasing local effectiveness (i.e. TFO's, CGIC's, Fusion Centers, Trafficking Strike Force Meetings, etc.)
- Identify agencies & individuals for the PSN responsible for sharing valuable data & intelligence.
- Define Antioch's violent



STRATEGIC PLAN AT-A-GLANCE **ANTIOCH**

identifying high-risk areas, groups, and individuals.

1.5: Enhance communication and coordination between agencies and organizations to align similar efforts and objectives.

1.6: Identify areas where public works and code enforcement can improve physical environment and remove conditions that contribute to violence.

1.7: Fully staff APD's Investigations Bureau, and enhance the filing and prosecution of violent crime cases.

1.8: Complete and review the Antioch PSP Non-fatal Shooting Assessment report with PSN partners and collaborate on improvements.

crime, and develop a tailored intervention focused on high-risk areas, individuals, groups & returning violent crime offenders (i.e. drivers of violent crime).

- CPTED implemented in recommended locations.
- Increase case clearances and prosecution of Antioch's violent crime at the federal & state level.
- Increase in detectives, analysts, and/or an in-house prosecutor.

Goal 2:

Identify community members, organizations & stakeholders to build & participate in a Public Safety Network (PSN) to focus on prevention, intervention and enforcement in high-risk areas, groups, and individuals.

Champion:

Lieutenant Joe Vigil

Strategies:

2.1: Identify the entities and individuals to participate in the PSN with special focus to include traditionally excluded entities and individuals. Establish a vetting process for the entities/individuals, and delineate roles and responsibilities related to strengths, and coordinate and maintain interaction to ensure collaboration.

2.2: Establish new partnerships and nurture existing relationships to build trust in the community.

Expected Outcomes:

- Establish listening sessions bringing together diverse stakeholder groups, LEO's & executives, researchers, academics, advocates & community members to participate in the PSN and study the city's problems from all perspectives.



STRATEGIC PLAN AT-A-GLANCE **ANTIOCH**

Corporal Price Kendall

- 2.3: Identify areas of overlap between programs and services that address conditions that contribute to violence and city funding programs
- 2.4: Identify programs and develop multi-partner collaborations and outreach projects to address conditions that contribute to violence. Foster relationships between the APD and youth programs that promote volunteer work to include community service, job skill development, and future employment opportunities.
- 2.5: Establish monthly meetings with Antioch Unified School District leadership to discuss youth violence trends and ongoing issues as well as solutions to them.
- 2.6: Establish the P.I.O. as the source for all internal PD related messaging to the public through social media and other news outlets as it relates to general ongoing messaging between the public and PD. To include the advertisement of PD events, crime alerts and investigations, questions and concerns, and community engagements.

- Create & maintain a resource document detailing CBO's, NGO's non-profits, faith-based organizations & stakeholders / supporters & their capabilities in the community.
- Document meetings w/AUSD leadership & implement student-based engagement, messaging, public safety education & youth focused programs & intervention.
- Embrace a culture of transparency by regularly and directly communicating with the community on critical incidents, public safety statements, policy, programs, and data related to targeted areas subject to violent crime.
- Using social media & other



STRATEGIC PLAN AT-A-GLANCE **ANTIOCH**

2.7: Build internal/external capacity for trauma informed responses to violence, and identify support capacity building where needed.

2.8: Develop a community ambassador program.

communication tools to provide information about common questions, current events, and concerns.

- Engagement with city departments and external stakeholders to provide youth-based programming and intervention for at-risk youth (Dept. of Public Safety and Community Resources, Youth Services, REACH, AUSD, etc.)
- Assign LEO's to establish new partnerships with members of city council based on community zoning & districts to enhance communication & address community needs.
- Decrease in violent crime among target populations for new focused deterrence based violence reduction or prevention programs.



STRATEGIC PLAN AT-A-GLANCE **ANTIOCH**

Goal 3:

Identify evidence-based technologies that align with data-driven solutions used to mitigate violent crime, build community trust & inform the PSN on the effective/efficient deployment of resources & tactics.

Champion:

Lieutenant John Fortner

Strategies:

- 3.1: Implement ShotSpotter Respond software to affect the following: Increase officer response to unreported gunshots; quickly locate and assist gunshot victims; and accurately geolocate incidents, time & number of gunshots. Use analytics to shape policy & inform officer response to gunshots and report out to the community public safety information.
- 3.2: Identify a new & innovative Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) / Records Management System (RMS) ensuring officers can access quick and comprehensive background information when responding to calls, and the Antioch Police Department (APD) can analyze data over time.
- 3.3: Create a public facing dashboard to share all publicly disclosable crime data with the community.
- 3.4: Create an anonymous reporting system that enables APD to partner with the community in preventing and reducing crime.

Expected Outcomes:

- Deploy ShotSpotter in high-risk areas, create a comprehensive policy highlighting best-practices, and report out to the community using direct communication, dashboards & media.
- Deploy new CAD/RMS system, train public safety members, leverage analytics, and data-share with PSN.
- Create new public-facing dashboards using current technologies (Peregrine, ShotSpotter, Esri, etc.) to inform the public on violent crime trends and other areas of interest.
- Identify, implement & use community input from the anonymous-capable reporting system to inform the PSN on violence reduction strategies and programs.



STRATEGIC PLAN AT-A-GLANCE

ANTIOCH

3.5: Review and discuss the Antioch PSP Technology Assessment to inform new practices, identify innovative technologies, and support investigative strategy development.

- Select and implement new Technology Assessment recommendations and best-practices.



National **Public Safety**
PARTNERSHIP

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

ANTIOCH, CALIFORNIA

MARCH 2023



BJA
Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice

Submitted by:
Alan J. Lee

This project was supported by Grant No. 2019-DG-BX-K001 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART). Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. All rights reserved. Copyright 2023.

The National Public Safety Partnership (PSP) provides coordinated training and technical assistance (TTA) upon request from participating state, local or tribal law enforcement and prosecution authorities. This assessment report was provided as part of a PSP TTA request and is the sole property of the requesting agency. While PSP participants are encouraged to collaborate with their local, state and federal law enforcement partners, the dissemination of this report is strictly defined by the requesting agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
INTRODUCTION	5
ASSESSMENT PROCESS	6
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	6
1. Enhance Relationship with Information Systems and Public Works	7
2. Consolidate Information Technology	8
3. Increase Civilian Staffing Levels	10
4. Build upon Regional Partnerships	11
5. Enhance Data Storage Capabilities	13
6. Cybersecurity Prevention	15
CONCLUSION	17
Appendix A: Abbreviations and Acronyms	18
Appendix B: The Assessment Team	19
Appendix C: Assessment Interview Schedule/List	20
Appendix D: Example of Cyber Security Notification	21
Appendix E: Recommendations Table and Timeline	26

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As part of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) National Public Safety Partnership (PSP), CNA engaged subject matter expert (SME) Alan Lee to conduct a technology assessment for the Antioch, California, PSP site. The purpose of this effort was to assist the Antioch Police Department (APD) with an evaluation of its current information technology strategies and offer recommendations as to how to best accomplish the goal of providing top-level service to its community.

To conduct this assessment SME Lee traveled to Antioch on October 10 through October 14, 2022. While on-site, SME Lee met with representatives from the APD command staff, detectives, personnel assigned to the Records Section, Crime Analysis Unit, Video Management Unit, Patrol, Criminal Investigations, Communications Bureau, and officers dedicated toward other individual technology-related projects, such as their unmanned aerial system drone project. SME Lee also met with the city of Antioch Information Systems Department (AISD). The discussions revealed many positive aspects of the APD's technology capabilities and effort.

This report and subsequent recommendations are based on the interviews, along with reviews of the completed PSP Technology Pre-Assessment Questionnaire, a comprehensive list of agency-wide software in use, and portions of the APD Policy and Procedure Manual. This assessment addresses the APD's most pressing technology needs and business relationships requiring attention. It appears that the APD is seriously committed to providing superior service to the city of Antioch. Its dedication, despite challenges, is impressive. If the APD chooses to incorporate the PSP recommendations into the current work, the department is well on its way to success.

As part of this technology assessment, SME Lee recommends a variety of actions to the APD for consideration. The recommendations are divided into the following areas and are discussed in further detail in this report:

- Consolidate information technology
- Enhance the relationship with the Antioch Information Systems Department
- Increase civilian staffing levels
- Build upon regional partnerships
- Enhance data storage capabilities
- Expand upon cyber security prevention

In closing, SME Lee would like to extend his gratitude to all APD staff who assisted with this assessment. Their valuable insight made this project possible.

INTRODUCTION

The National Public Safety Partnership (PSP) was launched in June 2017 by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) to serve as a DOJ-wide initiative enabling cities to consult with and receive coordinated training and technical assistance (TTA) and an array of resources from DOJ's programmatic and law enforcement components. PSP is an intensive TTA initiative designed to help selected cities develop the capacity to strategically reduce violent crime. Over a three-year implementation period, PSP provides police agencies and prosecutors with no-cost, customized assistance to support and enhance local violence reduction strategies. More information on the PSP can be found at www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/.

In 2021, Antioch was selected to join the PSP initiative. As part of the PSP, CNA¹ engaged subject matter expert (SME) Alan J. Lee to conduct a technology assessment for the Antioch, California, PSP Site Team. The purpose of this effort was to assist the Antioch Police Department (APD) with an evaluation of its current information technology (IT) strategies and offer recommendations as to how it may best accomplish its mission. The APD defines its mission as *"working in partnership with our community, to promote the quality of life in Antioch by proactively reducing crime with integrity and commitment to excellence."* During a multitude of meetings and discussions, SME Lee clearly observed the APD's dedication toward that mission, in addition to their goals:

- Commitment to values such as integrity, fairness, competency, and professionalism
- Desire to ensure positive and meaningful police-citizen interactions
- Striving to form partnerships with its community
- Preserving the peace and safety of the community, so Antioch remains a desirable place to live

Each of these points has underlying IT components and needs. Meeting the goals may not be possible if these needs are not acknowledged and addressed.

The APD has an authorized strength of 101 sworn officers and 36 civilian employees. The APD handles approximately 200,000 calls for service annually and has an advanced 911 computer dispatch system; an outstanding integrated data intelligence system; integrated in-car computers; and a commendable aerial drone program, supported by an outstanding, professional, and dedicated staff.

Overall, the interviews revealed positive aspects of the APD's technology capacities and effort. The APD is in a complex position when it comes to IT capabilities as the department relies on the AISD for most network technology projects and support, but those individuals are not APD employees. Challenges arise when utilizing AISD staff because the APD does not have direct control over specifying the priorities of project development, managing AISD employee schedules or overtime, or staffing decisions. The APD demonstrated it has hardworking staff who are ingenious in developing solutions to solve problems. However, the department appears to have no clear IT strategic plan.

¹ CNA is a training and technical assistance provider for the PSP program.

ASSESSMENT PROCESS

The PSP launched the technology assessment in August 2022. To prepare for the assessment, SME Lee reviewed the APD PSP Technology Assessment Questionnaire that included information on hardware and software currently in use by the APD and goals and needs identified by the site to enhance technological capacity. In September 2022, the PSP Project Team conducted an initial call with Lt. John Fortner, the APD primary point of contact for the technology assessment. During that call, the APD Technology Assessment Questionnaire was reviewed and discussed. The APD expressed concern with its current records management system (RMS), advising it had experienced major problems with the vendor. It also noted interest in implementing a Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) and requested feedback in this assessment related to the feasibility of an RTCC implementation.

Subsequent to the initial call, SME Lee requested and reviewed various materials related to technology, such as an overview and summary of information on the city of Antioch and the APD, Incident-Based Reporting Group A criminal offenses submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a comprehensive list of agency-wide software in use, and portions of the APD Policy Manual.

To conduct the technology assessment, SME Lee traveled to Antioch, California, during the week of October 10 through October 14, 2022, and met with APD staff. During these meetings, APD staff relayed many positive aspects of APD's technology capabilities and efforts. This report and subsequent recommendations are based on the interviews and documentation provided for review. This assessment addresses the APD's most pressing technology needs, policies and procedures, and business relationships requiring attention. It does not address every issue or need mentioned by the APD. For example, topics such as requests for additional funding and purchase of specific pieces of already identified software are not included in this report.


The following observations and recommendations are based on information gathered during 4 virtual and 12 in-person meetings conducted between August and November 2022. During those meetings, SME Lee met with members of the APD command staff and officers assigned to the Field Services and Support Services Divisions. Dedicated meetings were conducted primarily among representatives tasked with completing crime statistics/mapping, records management, intelligence gathering, video surveillance/storage, criminal investigations, and mobile technology. An on-site virtual call was also conducted with staff from the city of Antioch Information Systems Department (AISD). The interviews were constructed to ascertain the needs of each component and how those needs correlate with the overall technology plans of the APD.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As part of this technology assessment, SME Lee offers the following observations and recommendations to the APD for consideration. The recommendations are divided into the following areas:

- Consolidate information technology
- Enhance the relationship with the Antioch Information Systems Department
- Increase civilian staffing levels
- Build upon regional partnerships
- Enhance data storage capabilities
- Expand upon cyber security prevention

The APD and AISD have a genuine commitment to leveraging technology to meet the mission of the APD in caring for the city of Antioch and providing excellence in police service. To assist the APD with implementing the recommendations listed in this report, SME Lee has provided suggested time frames for implementing each recommendation which can be found in Appendix E. Throughout the body of this report, each recommendation is paired with an icon, either short-term or long-term. The short-term time frame refers to recommendations which the SME suggests the agency implement within one year. The long-term time frame refers to recommendations the SME suggests the agency implement in a period of one to two years. During the assessment process, the PSP Site Team will work with the APD to review and prioritize the recommendations as part of an implementation plan that will be tracked through the PSP engagement. ***Training and technical assistance to implement these recommendations are available through PSP upon request.***



It appears the APD is taking its commitment to providing superior service to the city of Antioch seriously. The APD's dedication, despite several technology, staffing, and financial challenges, is impressive. If the APD chooses to incorporate the PSP recommendations into the current work, the department will be well on its way to success.²

1. ENHANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC WORKS

Strengthen Communication, Collaboration, and Relationships

As part of this assessment, SME Lee learned that while the APD handles its own digital forensic needs, the AISD supports almost all APD network technology needs, including mobile technology, web access, fiber network, computers, server support, remote access, and vendor coordination. However, SME Lee was not able to confirm the existence of service level agreements (SLAs), and it does not appear there are any formal SLAs in place that govern this technology relationship.

Based on the discussions with the APD and AISD, there appears to be a gap in the working relationship between these two departments. This is not meant to indicate that they do not get along or do not work together; it simply means more could be done to improve their interactions. The APD expressed a desire for independence. However, creating a separate and self-supporting IT domain will not be a simple or inexpensive endeavor, so it should be pursued cautiously. In addition, the APD was unaware of the AISD having any sort of continuance of operation plan or backup system that would ensure recovery if the APD were to fall victim to a cyberattack. The creation and maintenance of enterprise-level technology architecture are believed to be the responsibility of the AISD, along with all support and responsibility regarding fiber, network infrastructure, and maintenance of an email system. The architecture to physically connect the APD into a shared network is an involved process, and the APD is wise to allow the AISD to maintain responsibility for that support. The connection to the "outside world" is the fiber network managed by the AISD. That architecture is key for the APD to access everything from the internet, the National Crime Information Center, Evidence.com, etc.

The APD, AISD, and Antioch Public Works Department (APWD) geographical information systems (GIS) staff expressed frustrations with current processes. It appears there are common themes of a lack of understanding

² Disclaimer: Any/all software mentioned as part of this assessment are programs either currently utilized by the APD or are for illustrative purposes. No references to programs/applications should be considered endorsements or purchase recommendations.

regarding current workload strains, inadequate staffing, budget constraints, and a general “they don’t understand us” mentality apparent within all three departments. To be clear, this is not a critique of those findings, as they can be common in departments across the country. The solution is that relationships can improve through a combined effort by all parties. Information sharing should not be restricted to only when a problem arises or something is needed. Having scheduled and ongoing meetings where all parties gather provides the benefits of learning about projects that may otherwise not be discussed, along with soliciting feedback and other viewpoints on critical matters.

Recommendations:



1.1: Create SLAs between the APD and AISD that clearly outline responsibilities and shared expectations.



1.2: Request the AISD provide a continuance of operations plan, detailing how it actively addresses cybersecurity, patch management, backups, and data restoration.



1.3: Include a member of the AISD staff in all technology-related meetings and discussions.

Including the AISD earlier in the planning phases will eliminate possible difficulties later when a project is already “live” and AISD assistance is required to remedy a problem.



1.4: Establish and arrange an ongoing meeting schedule between the appropriate APD, AISD, and APWD staff.

The discussions in these meetings should be documented and shared between all involved parties. The notes should clearly outline any expectations, decisions, and next steps that may be agreed on, along with dates for expected delivery and next steps.

2. CONSOLIDATE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Organizational Structure

The APD is faced with a difficult challenge—how to offer an increased list of services without the necessary resources. An examination of the APD organization chart in the Antioch 2021–23 Operating Budget clearly depicts the steps to address requirements that may exist outside the traditional patrol and investigative aspects of law enforcement. For example, the limitations imposed by only having two captains, who function as assistant chiefs, force all actions/tasks to be classified as either Field Services or Support Services. It is worth noting how things are organized and more importantly, what is not shown. Through various discussions it was determined that in some instances, individual staff members are overseeing technology projects that are not depicted within the organizational structure. For example, the APD utilizes Axon body-worn cameras (BWC) and has a commendable unmanned aerial vehicle drone program, but these sorts of projects cannot be located on its organizational chart. There is also no reference to any sort of technology support or oversight. It appears staff simply know who to contact for assistance, as these roles are not clearly delineated areas of responsibility.

Currently, technology and information management within the APD is treated in a diversified fashion, spread across the agency. This sort of approach may often result in silos where data and information may not be fully shared, collaboration opportunities are lost, and money may be wasted. The APD has taken one step to address information sharing by contracting with a vendor to provide a single query tool returning data from several databases. This is a positive step, but Peregrine has to develop each application programming interface (API) separately, so it takes time. Based on brief discussions, it is clear, like many other police departments across

the county, that the APD faces staffing challenges. However, the complex nature of implementing and managing technology projects requires a centralized approach.

Recommendations:



2.1: Consolidate the technology projects under a single command.



2.1.1: If a consolidated approach cannot be undertaken, at a minimum, assign technology review to a single commander within the organizational structure.

Technology Integration Unit Creation

From a technology standpoint, it appears the APD has addressed the need to gather and manage technology from a singular, needs-based approach over many years. A needs-based implementation is based on the concept that when an individual component identifies a problem, hardware or software is identified and implemented to address the need for that component or unit. The issue with this approach is that it can result in the procurement of multiple commercial off-the-shelf applications, which could lead to duplicating abilities, as one operational unit is unaware that another unit possesses a tool to complete the task it seeks. For example, in advance of this technology assessment, the APD provided a listing of approximately one-dozen separate technology programs currently in use. However, during the on-site meetings, many additional applications were discovered, such as GIS, website development, and video management. Some of these programs are designed to share information, and others operate solely in a stand-alone proprietary fashion. The programs seem to reside on local area network shared drives and individual computers. While using these types of applications may satisfy the need of an individual organization component, they also introduce a multitude of problems.

There is a broad line between the purchasing and implementation of any technology system. While it may take some time or administrative processes to procure a piece of hardware or execute a contract with a technology vendor to bring something such as a records management or personnel tracking system online, these tasks are often still easier than making projects work. A much finer line exists between the development and management of technology projects. If the APD chooses to establish a technology integration unit (TIU), that unit would be responsible for the design, configuration, implementation, possible repair, and maintenance of technology initiatives. TIU would consult with various APD units as needs arise and assist with bringing systems online. The long-term support of servers, application of software patches, license renewals, and contract maintenance should all be considered within the IT scope, but because of a lack of staff, the APD will likely need to continue to rely on the AISD for enterprise-level assistance and support. However, if a technology unit is also charged with administering the daily use and oversight, it will quickly discover that it lacks the personnel and resources to keep new projects moving forward.

Generally, a TIU should not be tasked with daily operations of actual applications. That function should rest with the primary user group or local system administrators. In essence, it is a “get it running and hand it over” approach. An APD TIU should engage any specific operational components early in the project planning phase so that final project management responsibilities can be agreed upon and documented. This will eliminate later confusion of responsibilities. For example, the TIU may be responsible for the implementation of the new, planned RMS, but it should never assume the monthly IBR-based reporting mandates. The TIU staffing does not need to include sworn officers, and all positions could be civilians, which reduces issues associated with transfers.

Recommendations:



2.2: Create a TIU.

If the APD chooses to create a TIU and take a more active role in the management of IT, the department must not ignore the segregation of disparate systems within its own APD needs. In most instances, police departments lack the financial resources; necessary staff, with the requisite knowledge; and infrastructure to design and build their own independent computer networks. The general findings are that some agencies outsource their needs to third-party providers and use various forms of service support, as seen through cloud platforms and full systems as a service—for example, the use of Evidence.com for the storage and management of digital files. These platforms can become a viable option, but an agency still needs to determine what it will use to do its daily work and what connections must be established to access these services. APD may want to contact the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD), which has a dedicated Information Technology Division, and discuss the process the SFPD went through to develop its division.

The department would be wise to explore the various options for establishing a TIU, including a three-stage hybrid approach in which it relies on the AISD to address enterprise-level network support, the APD to manage selected hardware, and vendor contract support in areas where the APD or AISD does not currently have the necessary resources.



2.3: Consider placement of the TIU directly under the Support Services Division captain.

This placement is recommended so the TIU may operate independently and not feel pressured to address one operational component's needs over any other.



2.4: Consider staffing the TIU with civilian members of the department.

A TIU does not have to be supervised, managed, or staffed by sworn officers. SME Lee ascertained as a result of this assessment that the city of Antioch provides funding for a technology budget. The APD and the city should discuss the possibility of including APD personnel within that funding, to staff the TIU. See *recommendation 3 for more information on implementing this recommendation.*

3. INCREASE CIVILIAN STAFFING LEVELS

Create Technology-Centered Positions

The creation of a TIU would necessitate dedicated staffing, and the first position should be a chief technology officer (CTO), or another named manager. While numerous law enforcement agencies are currently facing hiring and retention issues when dealing with sworn personnel, there is no need to fill technology positions with police officers. Civilian technology expertise is abundant. If the CTO were a sworn officer, the rank would preferably be at a command level of lieutenant or above, but that is not a requirement nor a recommendation. The APD should consider hiring civilian staff to fill technology roles, such as technology project managers, database administrators, and hardware technicians. The APD will need to determine exact staffing levels. Whether it is one person or a TIU consisting of three or more people, having staff with the sole purpose of technology support is critical.

The APD could substantially benefit by having its own internal staff to handle initial-level hardware support, along with having a competent database administrator with experience in SQL programming. These personnel would become the focal points whenever new software is implemented and/or application programming interfaces need to be implemented for system connectivity.

Recommendations:



3.1: Create technology-centered positions and hire appropriately.



3.1.1 Contact local colleges or universities and attend job fairs to staff technology-centered positions.

Several colleges are near the APD.; Contra Costa College, St. Mary's College of California, Merritt College, and Los Medanos College all offer technology-based programs and could provide recruiting locations. Graduating students seeking employment will be interested in full-time employment within their local community.



3.1.2 Consider offering internship programs to current students.

Before completing their secondary education, students often seek internship programs to demonstrate their skills and convert what they have learned into an actionable product.



3.1.3 Retired officers may be interested in returning to work for APD in a civilian support role.

This may also be a way to retain employees who are seeking new challenges.

4. BUILD UPON REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

Technology Is about Information Sharing

While SME Lee learned that APD officers, AISD staff, and members of other city of Antioch departments, such as Public Works, held occasional meetings, it did not appear those meetings carried much weight, and involvement was somewhat limited. The APD may find it useful to establish a standing monthly meeting, inviting all public safety agencies in the area to discuss and implement technology recommendations that would be mutually beneficial. Ideally, this working group should include other public safety and criminal justice agencies in Antioch and possibly involve neighboring law enforcement agencies in Contra Costa County. Departments such as Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART); those in Brentwood, Concord, Danville, or Oakley; and the Pittsburgh Police Department likely face many of the same technology issues. Jurisdictional issues may need to be addressed, but a large portion of IT management and implementation is not tied to hardware and software as much as it is to relationships.

The APD and many others face challenges and become limited in carrying out their missions efficiently because they simply do not communicate. A Criminal Justice Technology Working Group (CJTWG) would be a way for the APD to demonstrate work being done by its new TIU, establish working relationships, obtain grant funding through partnership programs and joint ventures, and most importantly, develop a better understanding of the challenges faced by everyone in the regional IT arena.

Recommendations:



4.1: Contact all city of Antioch and Contra Costa County Criminal Justice and/or Public Safety agencies and determine interest in establishing a CJTWG. If a group is created:



4.1.1: Consider establishing a fixed, monthly meeting schedule.



4.1.2: Rotate the hosting location and possible chairperson to provide additional exposure for all involved agencies.

Real Time Crime Center and Crime Analysis

One of the specific areas for which the APD requested feedback as part of this assessment was in developing a RTCC. This section will touch on basic thoughts, but a comprehensive evaluation of a RTCC implementation would require a separate focused assessment on that topic. As the APD contemplates a RTCC creation, several key points should be considered related to the mission, funding, potential for regional collaboration, staffing, and software needs. Many times, when police departments discuss RTCC creation, the first thoughts are of a room filled with computer screens depicting closed-circuit video feeds, GIS maps, views into computer aided dispatch (CAD) and RMS, and photographs from driver's licenses and booking incidents. However, before any hardware is installed or software purchased, the first step is to define the mission of the RTCC. In a basic sense, the purpose of a RTCC is to provide patrol officers and detectives instant access to information. This can be done with or without a "fancy room" of computers. Current cloud-based technology could provide a similar unified awareness to officers in the field. This does not mean that physical RTCCs are not useful or do not fill a vital role, but they are not the only solution.

If the APD decides to construct an actual RTCC they should begin immediate discussions focused on funding. A RTCC can be an expensive endeavor, running anywhere between hundreds of thousands of dollars to several million. SME Lee obtained and examined the Antioch 2021–23 Operating Budget. That budget does not contain any dedicated line items or mention a RTCC. The Police Administration (100-3110) and Community Policing Bureau (100-3150) budgets include funding for expansion of video projects, deployment of a new CAD/RMS, and allocation of funds to replace equipment. The APD will likely be faced with a choice of reallocating planned funding from other projects to address the RTCC or exploring options. The APD may want to discuss the possibility of a construction improvement project whereby the city of Antioch could fund the expense over several fiscal years.

Another option to consider is for the APD to become a sponsoring/hosting agency and, rather than creating a dedicated APD RTCC, exploring the possibility of a regional RTCC. Many times, criminals do not recognize or limit their actions to a single location, and when several municipalities coexist in a small area, people will consistently cross boundaries. A regional approach would promote collaboration and funding could be shared across agencies. In addition to the financial burdens of RTCC creation, the issue of staffing must also be addressed. A well-designed RTCC is operated 24/7 with appropriate levels of dedicated staff. If a regional center were undertaken, multiple departments could contribute personnel and no single agency would have to bear the complete burden.

The choice of software to be utilized in RTCC daily operations is another decision the APD will have to address. Common types of RTCC-centric software often integrate APIs into existing CAD software; RMS; arrest, booking, court management systems; and local and state arrest warrant systems, whereby the APIs enable "super queries." Those sorts of queries allow users to perform a single search and receive results from all the disparate systems. On a positive note, and worth commending, is that the APD has already undertaken this sort of interface. The APD has a current contract with Peregrine Technologies and many of the above referenced systems are already interconnected. Other types of frequently utilized software are video management, situational awareness, and predictive analysis (often referred to as artificial intelligence). The APD is doing a superb job with overseeing closed-circuit video management. It has combined Vigilant and Flock Safety cameras and license plate readers in multiple locations. These connections provide live video monitoring of key traffic intersections throughout Antioch.

The implementation of software within a RTCC is dependent upon the RTCC mission. It is generally agreed that the primary function of a RTCC is to provide near-real-time information sharing. However, some agencies choose to incorporate this function as part of a larger scale crime analysis capability, while other agencies choose to separate these two tasks. The APD will need to determine early on in which direction they wish to proceed. Within both, RTCCs and crime analysis units, a key software component often provides artificial intelligence that, when combined with business intelligence, allows departments to predict future crime. Obviously, there is no crystal ball that is always correct, but by ingesting large amounts of data from disparate systems, meaningful information can often be produced. There are several companies that specialize in this field of software development. One of which is Motorola Command Central. The APD previously utilized this product, but due to cost and interconnectivity, they chose to discontinue the relationship. If a RTCC does come to fruition, the APD will likely need to revisit this issue. One additional tool they may want to explore is the functionality provided through Microsoft Business Intelligence (PowerBI). The APD and APWD are both familiar with and currently use the Microsoft Office365 suite. Microsoft PowerBI is another product that could be easily implemented. PowerBI provides a tool available directly to the APD, allowing it to create automated dashboards without the need and expense of waiting for a vendor or AISD assistance. The APD crime analyst acknowledged familiarity with PowerBI and had interest in expanding its use, but that would require additional training.

Recommendations:



4.2: Determine whether the creation of a RTCC is in the best interest of the APD.



4.2.1: Consider financial commitment of physical construction and identify funding sources.



4.2.2: Consider staffing levels and whether APD will hire civilian analysts, reallocate sworn officers from existing assignments, or a combination of the two.



4.3: Explore the possibility of creating a regional RTCC involving several partner departments.



4.3.1: If this option is chosen, it will require legally sufficient memoranda of understanding signed by all partners, designating areas of responsibility, staffing, etc.



4.4: Carefully evaluate and choose software that is compatible with as many existing systems already in use, thus reducing software expenses.



4.4.1: Explore PowerBI and GIS training for the crime analyst and possible RTCC use.

5. ENHANCE DATA STORAGE CAPABILITIES

Digital Evidence

Before the early 2000s, evidence was generally centered on physical items left behind at a crime scene. However, during the last few decades, the idea and importance of evidence has greatly expanded. Digital evidence now includes everything from human fingerprints to ballistic fingerprints and DNA mapping to geofencing mapping. This data must be stored, and traditional internal and external hard drives are no longer the solution. Massive storage of big data can be challenging, but it must be addressed.

SME Lee learned that the APD is not equipped to handle digital storage needs, and the department does not appear to be receiving the necessary storage support from the AISD. For example, a major crime investigation

for a homicide or commercial robbery can result in dozens of closed-circuit videos, computer logs, etc. easily running in multiple gigabytes. Currently, the APD stores digital evidence on local servers. That same evidence is backed up on external hard drives, which is an extremely unreliable and dangerous way of handling evidence. Any one of those external drives is one magnet or accidental drop away from malfunctioning, which could have a devastating effect on future court cases. Note that referenced digital evidence is separate and apart from BWC evidence, which is uploaded to the Axon evidence.com cloud. While separate meetings were held with APD detectives and the AISD staff, both groups mentioned that digital evidence management and storage are of major concern.

Recommendations:



5.1: Engage AISD in a discussion regarding long-term data storage.

During this discussion, storage options discussed should focus on three aspects: local, cloud, and a hybrid mix.



5.2: If the city cannot provide or meet APD requirements, reach out to local companies in the region and determine if they can support APD needs.



5.3: If pursuing a cloud storage solution, discuss additional options regarding warm and cold storage for data that is required to be maintained because of retention laws, but not immediately accessed. Those options will be more cost-effective.

Forensic Evidence

Digital evidence contains the types of items mentioned above, but forensic evidence expands on these to include things such as Cellebrite cellular phone downloads; cloned computer hard drives; and high-level confidential investigations, such as internet crimes against children investigations. For example, forensic examinations of cellular phones using Cellebrite create multiple files, and based on the storage capacity of the examined phone, those files can easily exceed one gigabyte. The APD maintains sole responsibility for this sort of forensic evidence. A major problem exists in that forensic evidence is currently processed and subsequently placed on network-attached storage (NAS) and/or external hard drives. While this solution currently works, there is generally no automated backup for these types of storage. Thus, if the APD equipment, computers, server, or NAS were to become compromised or infected with malware, all stored forensic evidence could be compromised or destroyed. Such damage would ultimately affect criminal investigative processes and court prosecutions.

Recommendations:



5.4: Continue discussions between the APD and AISD regarding the ongoing forensic evidence storage issue.



5.5: Identify funding needs that can be used to purchase a complete life-cycle storage solution.

This solution should include additional server storage, automated server management software and backups, an established patch schedule, and auditing and reporting capabilities.



5.6: Expand storage capabilities from the terabyte level to a petabyte.



5.7: Consider adding additional staffing to the investigative unit currently managing forensic evidence, as the current staffing level of one officer cannot manage this level of digital/forensic evidence.

Note: as mentioned earlier, these positions could be filled with civilians.

6. CYBERSECURITY PREVENTION

Risk Is Everywhere

During a discussion with a chief of police from the Major Cities Chiefs Association, SME Lee was asked whether he believed his agency was protected from a cyberattack. The answer: "Of course not, and it never will be." In today's cyber world, anyone who feels their agency is safe has little concept regarding present threats. Malware, phishing, spear phishing, and smishing are common means to install malware, capture and harvest data, or worse, install ransomware. Ransomware usually attacks network systems or servers, locking data and often preventing agencies from restoring the affected information.

In addition, some police departments face double extortion when suspects harm an agency and threaten to leak information that may harm the public. For example, multiple police departments were hit by a ransomware attack last year, and in at least one instance, the suspects released officers' personal information, along with some confidential informants' identities.

There are many approaches to addressing cybersecurity, but a singular tactic of Zero Trust may provide the best approach. In the past, cybersecurity was often addressed with a castle-and-moat mentality. The idea was that a castle and everything contained inside would be kept safe by building tall walls, controlling access through a drawbridge that could be closed, and having a moat to keep intruders at bay. Unfortunately, that is no longer the case.

Zero Trust is a mindset based on the philosophy that just because a device or person has been trustworthy in the past does not mean it can be assumed to be trustworthy in the future. The approach assumes a suspect could already be present in the computer network. By adopting a Zero-Trust policy, the APD and AISD would require users to prove who they are anytime they want to access data. This is much different from the traditional process of logging in using only a name and password and obtaining full access to internal resources. The easiest example of enhancing security would be for the APD to require the AISD to move toward multifactor authentication (MFA). Many people are familiar with MFA technology used in online banking. In addition, network resources and data availability should be based on a least-privilege methodology, in which users are only granted rights to the minimal areas necessary to do their jobs.

Currently, the AISD oversees and has responsibility for cybersecurity needs. However, during discussions with the APD and AISD, SME Lee found it extremely concerning that the AISD staff was only able to answer basic cybersecurity-related questions. When asked about employees accessing systems locally and remotely, the common answer was that it is all managed through Microsoft Active Directory (AD). While AD does provide some level of security, it is only as good as the user roles. For example, SME Lee inquired what measures were in place to address security for users accessing an Office365 account through a personally owned device, cell phone, or computer. The response was "I don't think that is possible," which clearly demonstrates there is not enough being done to prevent cyber intrusions. On a positive front, the AISD currently uses Arctic Wolf as a monitoring solution. But in the case of a breach, those actions are after the fact and damage may have already occurred.

For example, the APD email can be encrypted, but encryption is not required. If an email were to be intercepted or obtained by a bad actor, there is potential for network access that could move laterally across a network. There are numerous groups with the mission of assisting in the cyber battle. Examples include the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Membership to these groups is granted at no cost to police departments, and the groups provide timely information. A sample CISA notice is included in Appendix D.

In addition, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) plays a role in defending against cybersecurity threats. NCRIC is run in partnership with the Northern California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program. If the APD has not already done so, they should consider joining NCRIC. Membership is available to local law enforcement agencies.

Recommendations:



6.1: Request the AISD provide the APD with a copy of its network architecture.

This will give the APD a general idea of what products and servers the AISD has, where they are located, and who is responsible for maintaining them.



6.2: Request from the AISD copies of network security plans, which should include topics such as hardware maintenance, including switches and servers; patch maintenance and installation schedules; license agreements with outside vendors; contingency of operation plan, in case of compromise; and backup schedules.



6.3: Obtain information from the AISD on how default user accounts are created.

For example, do they automatically receive access to network resources through AD? Do they automatically receive an email account? Are strong passwords mandated? How many criteria must be met?



6.4: Review the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) outlining seven tenets in a 2021 draft white paper and 2020 publication, which APD may find useful.

Additional information can be found at <https://www.nist.gov/cybersecurity>.



6.5: Consider joining the MS-ISAC, which provides a wealth of information on technology and cyber topics.

Additional information can be found at <https://www.cisecurity.org/ms-isac>.



6.6: Consider joining the NCRIC, which provides a wealth of information on technology and cyber topics along with regional training opportunities.

Additional information can be found at <https://ncric.ca.gov/>.

CONCLUSION

While conducting the assessment, it was readily apparent to SME Lee that under the leadership of Police Chief Steven Ford and his executive team, the APD is accomplishing many commendable things. To continue the path to progress, both sworn and civilian staffing levels should be increased.

The APD appears to be solid in accomplishing its mission of protection and care for the well-being of the community while providing excellence in police service. A review of the APD's website and news sites highlights many wonderful things the people of the APD accomplish daily. However, APD also recognizes it cannot remain stagnant and rest on past successes. The APD acknowledges a need to move forward and is cognizant that technology plays a large part in what it hopes to achieve. From the IT standpoint, the agency seems to be in transition. The APD has embraced technology and has implemented or is in the process of bringing on new technology. The diversity of personnel willing to tackle new issues is admirable. Because of the design of agency management within the city of Antioch, the APD is supported by the AISD; however, they lack a cohesive approach to IT management. It is apparent that the APD and AISD realize their challenges and are trying to improve processes. Implementing a single, unified technology and information management strategy, along with creating a strategic vision and plan for true information sharing, will reward the APD with great dividends.

A special word of thanks goes to Lieutenant John Fortner, who facilitated and participated in every virtual meeting and was available for several follow-up phone calls during his off-duty time. This assessment has been a pleasure, and if the APD has any further needs, the department is encouraged to contact the PSP Team.

APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AD	Active Directory
AISD	Antioch Information Systems Department
APD	Antioch Police Department
API	application programming interface
APWD	AISD and Public Works Department
BART	Bay Area Rapid Transit
BWC	body-worn camera
CAD	computer aided dispatch
CapWIN	Capital Wireless Network
CIO	chief information officer
CIP	construction improvement project
CISA	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CJTWG	Criminal Justice Technology Working Group
CTO	chief technology officer
DOJ	United States Department of Justice
GIS	geographical information systems
IT	information technology
MFA	multifactor authentication
MS-ISAC	Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center
NAS	network-attached storage
NCIC	National Crime Information Center
NCRIC	Northern California Regional Intelligence Center
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
PGPD	Prince George's County Police Department
PowerBI	Microsoft Business Intelligence
PSP	National Public Safety Partnership
RMS	records management system
RTCC	Real Time Crime Center
SFPD	San Francisco Police Department
SLA	service level agreements
SME	subject matter expert
TIU	technology integration unit
TTA	training and technical assistance

APPENDIX B: THE ASSESSMENT TEAM



Alan Lee is the chief information officer (CIO) with the Prince George's County Police Department (PGPD) in Maryland. He has served in that role since September 2012. He possesses more than 30 years of law enforcement and 20 years of information technology experience.

Mr. Lee obtained his undergraduate degree in criminal justice and computer science from the University of Louisiana. While attending college full time, he worked for the University of Louisiana and New Iberia Police Departments. Shortly after graduation, he began working for the Shreveport Police Department in Louisiana, later moving to Maryland and accepting a job with the PGPD.

During his career with PGPD, Mr. Lee held a variety of assignments, serving as a patrol officer, detective, training academy instructor, patrol supervisor, crime analyst supervisor, hostage negotiation commander, information technology commander, intelligence and protective services commander, technical services division commander, and operations duty commander. Major Alan Lee retired from the PGPD in November 2009.

Upon retirement from PGPD, Mr. Lee accepted a position with the University of Maryland's College of Civil and Environmental Engineering. He worked as the field services manager for the next three years in the Center for Advanced Transportation Technology's Capital Wireless Network (CapWIN) project. During that time, he oversaw and managed more than 130 law enforcement agencies through the Maryland, Virginia, and District of Columbia region, assisting with interoperability needs. While at CapWIN, Mr. Lee pursued his graduate-level degree and now possesses a master of science in management of information systems and services.

In 2012, Mr. Lee was approached by PGPD and agreed to accept the newly created role of CIO. Since then, he established the PGPD's Information Technology Division. During the last 10 years, he has overseen and been instrumental in the deployment of a new RMS; a body-worn camera system; the redesign of a Joint Analysis Information Center; transition from the Uniform Crime Report Summary to National Incident-Based Reporting; rollout of a radio frequency ID property and evidence tracking program; and in consulting on the technology aspects for two new district stations, a property warehouse, and a new police headquarters.

Mr. Lee currently serves on the Executive and Governance Board for the National Capitol Region Law Enforcement Information Exchange, on the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments' Police Technology Committee, as the chair of the CapWIN Board of Directors, and as a subject matter expert for CNA.

APPENDIX C: ASSESSMENT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE/LIST




The below-listed individuals participated in virtual meetings and phone conference calls as part of this technology assessment:

- Lieutenant John Fortner, APD Technology and Investigation Services Commander
- Lieutenant Desmond Bittner, APD Patrol Commander
- Sergeant Matt Koch, APD Special Operations Unit
- Amanda Nelson, APD Records Management
- Diane Nieves, APD Records Management
- Corporal Adrian Gonzalez, Technology and Unmanned Aircraft System Supervisor
- Michael Rainey, APD Crime Analyst
- Alan Barton, Director, Antioch Information Systems Department
- Jose Ureno, Antioch Information Systems Department
- Jennifer Wilson, Antioch Information Systems Department
- Brandon Peters, Antioch Public Works Department, Geographic Information Systems
- Aakash Pattabi, Peregrine Technologies
- Justin Sealy, Peregrine Technologies

APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE OF CYBER SECURITY NOTIFICATION

The information on the following pages is an example of the type of information available from the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. There is no charge for membership, and daily emails are sent to members, which the APD may find beneficial.

APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE OF CYBER SECURITY NOTIFICATION



TLP:AMBER


DEFEND TODAY.
SECURE TOMORROW

Cyber Risk Summary: SLTT Government Facilities


April 2022

FINDINGS


Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Cyber Hygiene Vulnerability Scanning (CyHy VS) performed between October 1, 2020, and September 30, 2021, made the following observations associated with vulnerabilities in State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Facilities (SLTT) entities' IT assets.




53 known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs) used by threat actors to compromise private and public entities were active on **636 scanned SLTT entities** in FY21.




42.3% of scanned SLTT entities used a potentially exposed risky service, such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), on internet-accessible hosts¹, which can provide initial access and communication channels for command and control, and data exfiltration.



31.1% of the scanned SLTT entities ran unsupported Windows operating systems (OSs)² on at least one internet-accessible host by the end of FY21, a decrease from early FY21.



213 cross-site scripting and **151** SQL injection weaknesses were observed on SLTT web applications exposed to the internet that almost certainly increase risk of compromise.



6.22% average reduction in active vulnerabilities within the first three months by newly enrolled SLTT entities in CyHy VS from October 2020 to September 2021.

MITIGATIONS

CISA recommends the following mitigations to reduce cyber risk among SLTT entities.

Patch Management

OBSERVATION: Threat actors scan for and target vulnerable internet-accessible hosts to launch attacks. CISA scanning indicated that 56.8 percent of KEV instances observed in FY21 were not remediated by the end of FY21, increasing risk of compromise. The median days to remediate critical and high vulnerabilities with exploits available was 184 days and







¹ "Glossary." National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Computer Resource Center. accessed February 10, 2022. <https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/host>

² Windows 7, Windows Vista, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, and Windows Server 2008 are the only OSs considered unsupported in this analysis.

DISCLAIMER: This factsheet is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information within. DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this factsheet or otherwise. This document is distributed as TLP:AMBER: Limited disclosure, restricted to participants' organizations. Recipients may only share TLP:AMBER information with members of their own organization, and with clients or customers who need to know the information to protect themselves or prevent further harm. Sources are at liberty to specify additional intended limits of the sharing; these must be adhered to. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see <https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/tlp>

TLP:AMBER

CISA | DEFEND TODAY, SECURE TOMORROW

 cisa.gov  CSD_VM_Insights_Intake@cisa.dhs.gov  [Linkedin.com/company/cisagov](https://www.linkedin.com/company/cisagov)  [@CISAgov](https://twitter.com/CISAgov) | [@cyber](https://twitter.com/cyber) | [@uscert_gov](https://twitter.com/uscert_gov)  [Facebook.com/CISA](https://www.facebook.com/CISA)  [@cisagov](https://www.instagram.com/cisagov)

APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE OF CYBER SECURITY NOTIFICATION



98.5 days respectively, which likely indicates that those vulnerabilities persisted on SLTT entity networks for prolonged periods of time and increased risk of compromise. XSS and SQL injection weaknesses were frequently observed in SLTT entity web applications exposed to the internet, which require remediation to decrease risk of compromise.

MITIGATION: CISA recommends the following mitigations to improve patch management capabilities.

1. Reduce the backlog of vulnerabilities, prioritizing those with exploits available that could be used to breach the defensive perimeter. Use CISA's KEV Catalog to identify and timely remediate vulnerabilities on SLTT entity networks that may pose significant risk of compromise.
2. Prioritize remediation of vulnerabilities using a risk-based approach that considers likelihood of attack, ease of exploitation, and the magnitude of probable impact. Consider remediating active KEVs first and defining vulnerability prioritization mechanisms that consider contextual factors specific to each entity, such as the SSVC framework.³
3. Prioritize timely patching to ensure internal and external network traffic is protected with up-to-date and sufficient encryption protocols.
4. Utilize the OWASP Top Ten standard to reduce internet-accessible weaknesses on web applications.⁴

Potentially Risky Services

OBSERVATION: Threat actors seek to exploit certain services on entities' internet-accessible hosts to gain initial access to entity networks. Certain services like NetBIOS, Telnet, SMB, RDP, and others are vulnerable and are often exploited to deploy malware and move laterally throughout a network because these services are intended for use on a trusted network. In FY21, 42.3 percent of SLTT entities scanned were running at least one potentially risky service on an internet-accessible host.

MITIGATION: CISA recommends the following mitigations to avoid using potentially risky services.

1. To protect their networks from threat actors and zero-day vulnerabilities, SLTT entities should close all ports exposed to the internet, unless essential to business functions, and implement network segmentation enforced by ACLs with monitored logging. Entities should identify all internet-accessible services and secure or disable risky services according to the documented business reason for each service to operate.
2. In some cases, operating potentially risky services is necessary and can be accomplished by using additional security measures such as virtual private networks (VPNs), virtual network segmentation, secure credentials and MFA, host-based and network-based firewalls, transmission control protocol (TCP) access control lists and secure encryption. It is important to note that many potentially risky services are unique and may require tailored risk assessments to determine an effective risk management approach.

Unsupported Operating System Versions


OBSERVATION: Most of the critical vulnerabilities CISA found were related to a significant number of SLTT entities' using weak legacy OSs, software, and protocols. Threat actors target unsupported OSs, software, and protocols versions because their lack of security patches and updates increases the ease of exploitation. At the end of FY21, 31.1 percent of scanned entities and 3.5 percent of scanned hosts were running unsupported Windows OS versions, a decreasing trend throughout FY21. The most prevalent critical and high vulnerabilities were due to deprecated SSL version 2 and 3 protocols, unsupported web servers, and unsupported PHP versions, which almost certainly increase risk of compromise.

MITIGATION: CISA recommends the following mitigations for unsupported operating system versions.

³ "Prioritizing Vulnerability Response: A Stakeholder-Specific Vulnerability Categorization (Version 2.0)." Software Engineering Institute. <https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=653459>

⁴ "OWASP Top Ten." OWASP Foundation. <https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>.

APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE OF CYBER SECURITY NOTIFICATION



**DEFEND TODAY,
SECURE TOMORROW**

TLP:AMBER
Fact Sheet: SLTT Cyber Risk Summary

1. Entities should maintain a complete software asset inventory that includes the date when software and operating systems will no longer receive support.
2. Entities should identify and plan to allocate resources to replace IT—including software, firmware, OSs, and hardware—that is no longer supported or will reach end-of-support in the near future.
3. For software or operating systems that are unsupported but are required to meet business needs, entities should document exceptions and implement mitigating controls such as network segmentation to isolate vulnerable systems.







Spearphishing Weaknesses and Phishing Click Rates

OBSERVATION: Threat actors commonly use spearphishing weaknesses and phishing to gain initial access to restricted networks. Based on analysis of 123 RPTs, spearphishing weakness are likely common across SLTT entities, which may enable threat actors to gain network access and execute follow-on techniques. In CISA's simulated phishing assessments, SLTT users had a 10 percent click rate, suggesting that at least some SLTT entities are susceptible to phishing attempts that can enable higher consequence threat tactics and procedures, such as ransomware infections.

MITIGATION: CISA recommends the following mitigations for spearphishing weaknesses and phishing click rates.

1. Entities should implement extensive spearphishing training. Training should include simulated spearphishing campaigns to measure changes in the users' click rate.
2. MFA should be implemented for all external access to mitigate the risk of threat actors gaining access and control of users' accounts.
3. Network and mail server activity and endpoint processes should be monitored and logged to for abnormal activity and potentially malicious activities.

TLP:AMBER
CISA | DEFEND TODAY, SECURE TOMORROW

 cisa.gov  CSD_VM_Insights_Intake@cisa.dhs.gov  [Linkedin.com/company/cisagov](https://www.linkedin.com/company/cisagov)  [@CISAgov](https://twitter.com/CISAgov) | [@cyber](https://twitter.com/cyber) | [@uscert_gov](https://twitter.com/uscert_gov)  [Facebook.com/CISA](https://www.facebook.com/CISA)  [@cisagov](https://www.instagram.com/cisagov)

PAGE 24

APPENDIX D: EXAMPLE OF CYBER SECURITY NOTIFICATION

IMPLEMENTATION RESOURCES

CISA recommends the following additional resources to help improve SLTT entities' cybersecurity.

Frameworks and Controls	Technical Guidance	Services
NIST: Special Publication 800-40: Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Technologies	CISA: Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure	CISA's Cyber Hygiene Vulnerability Scanning and CISA's free Cybersecurity Services and Tools
NIST: Critical Cybersecurity Hygiene	CISA Insights: Understand Patches and Remediate Vulnerabilities for Internet-Accessible Systems	CISA's Detection and Prevention Services
CISA's Cybersecurity Framework	CISA-MS-ISAC Ransomware Guide	MS-ISAC Toolkit
Network Ports, Protocols, and Services: CIS Control 9 ; NIST CSF PR.IP-1 & DE.CM-8	CISA's guidance on ICS Recommended Practices	CIS: Endpoint Security Services (ESS)
NIST Special Publication 800-39: Managing Information Security Risk	MS-ISAC's guidance on How to Restrict Server Message Block (SMB)	CISA's National Cybersecurity Assessments and Technical Services
NIST Special Publication 800-30: Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments	CISA's guidance on Stuff Off Search (S.O.S)	MS-ISACs Albert Network Monitoring service
Inventory and Manage Software Assets: CIS Control 2 ; NIST CSF ID.AM-2	MS-ISAC's End-of-Support Software Report List	Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (RVA) and Phishing Campaign Assessment (PCA)
Email Protections: CIS Control 9 ; NIST CSF PR.IP-1, PR.AC-5, DE.CM-4 & 7	CISA Tip: Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks	
Security Awareness and Training: CIS Control 14 , NIST CSF ID.GV-1, ID.AM-6, PR.AT		

Note: Feedback regarding this product is critical to CISA's continuous improvement. If you have feedback specific to your experience with this product, please send CISA your input by filling out the [CISA Product Survey](#)

APPENDIX E: RECOMMENDATIONS TABLE AND TIMELINE

#	RECOMMENDATION	CATEGORY	AUDIENCE	TIME FRAME
1.1	Create SLAs between the APD and AISD that clearly outline responsibilities and shared expectations.	Enhance Relationship with Information Systems and Public Works	APD; AISD	90 days
1.2	Request the AISD provide a continuance of operations plan, detailing how it actively addresses cybersecurity, patch management, backups, and data restoration.	Enhance Relationship with Information Systems and Public Works	APD	90 days
1.3	Include a member of the AISD staff in all technology-related meetings and discussions.	Enhance Relationship with Information Systems and Public Works	APD; AISD	90 days
1.4	Establish and arrange an ongoing meeting schedule between the appropriate APD, AISD, and APWD staff.	Enhance Relationship with Information Systems and Public Works	APD; AISD; APWD	90 days
2.1	Consolidate the technology projects under a single command.	Consolidate Information Technology	APD	6 months
2.1.1	If a consolidated approach cannot be undertaken, at a minimum, assign technology review to a single commander within the organizational structure.	Consolidate Information Technology	APD	6 months
2.2	Create a TIU.	Consolidate Information Technology	APD	6 months
2.3	Consider placement of the TIU directly under the Support Services Division captain.	Consolidate Information Technology	APD	6 months
2.4	Consider staffing the TIU with civilian members of the department.	Consolidate Information Technology	APD	6 months
3.1	Create technology-centered positions and hire appropriately.	Increase Civilian Staffing Levels	APD	1 year
3.1.1	Contact local colleges or universities and attend job fairs to staff technology-centered positions.	Increase Civilian Staffing Levels	APD	1 year
3.1.2	Consider offering internship programs to current students.	Increase Civilian Staffing Levels	APD	1 year
3.1.3	Retired officers may be interested in returning to work for APD in a civilian support role.	Increase Civilian Staffing Levels	APD	1 year
4.1	Contact all city of Antioch and Contra Costa County Criminal Justice agencies and determine interest in establishing a CJTWG.	Build upon Regional Partnerships	APD	6 months
4.1.1	If a group is created consider establishing a fixed, monthly meeting schedule.	Build upon Regional Partnerships	APD	6 months
4.1.2	If a group is created rotate the hosting location and possible chairperson to provide additional exposure for all involved agencies.	Build upon Regional Partnerships	APD	6 months

APPENDIX E: RECOMMENDATIONS TABLE AND TIMELINE

#	RECOMMENDATION	CATEGORY	AUDIENCE	TIME FRAME
4.2	Determine if the creation of a RTCC is in the best interest of the APD.	Build upon Regional Partnerships	APD	6 months
4.2.1	Consider financial commitment of physical construction and identify funding sources.	Build upon Regional Partnerships	APD	6 months
4.2.2	Consider staffing levels and where APD will reallocate officers. Whether APD will hire civilian analysts, reallocate sworn officers from existing assignments, or a combination of the two.	Build upon Regional Partnerships	APD	6 months
4.3	Explore the possibility of creating a regional RTCC involving several partner departments.	Build upon Regional Partnerships	APD	6 months
4.3.1	If this option is chosen, it will require legally sufficient memoranda of understanding signed by all partners designating areas of responsibility, staffing, etc.	Build upon Regional Partnerships	APD	6 months
4.4	Carefully evaluate and choose software that is compatible with as many existing systems already in use, thus reducing software expenses.	Build upon Regional Partnerships	APD	6 months
4.4.1	Explore PowerBI and GIS training for the Crime Analyst and possible RTCC use.	Build upon Regional Partnerships	APD	6 months
5.1	Engage AISD in a discussion regarding long-term data storage.	Enhance Data Storage Capabilities	AISD	1 year
5.2	If the city cannot provide or meet APD requirements, reach out to local companies in the region and determine if they can support APD needs.	Enhance Data Storage Capabilities	APD	1 year
5.3	If pursuing a cloud storage solution, discuss additional options regarding warm and cold storage for data that is required to be maintained because of retention laws, but not immediately accessed. Those options will be more cost-effective.	Enhance Data Storage Capabilities	APD	1 year
5.4	Continue discussions between the APD and AISD regarding the ongoing forensic evidence storage issue.	Enhance Data Storage Capabilities	APD; AISD	1 year
5.5	Identify funding needs that can be used to purchase a complete life-cycle storage solution.	Enhance Data Storage Capabilities	APD	1 year
5.6	Expand storage capabilities from the terabyte level to a petabyte.	Enhance Data Storage Capabilities	APD	1 year
5.7	Consider adding additional staffing to the investigative unit currently managing forensic evidence, as the current staffing level of one officer cannot manage this level of digital/forensic evidence.	Enhance Data Storage Capabilities	APD	1 year
6.1	Request the AISD provide the APD with a copy of its network architecture.	Cybersecurity Prevention	AISD; APD	6 months

APPENDIX E: RECOMMENDATIONS TABLE AND TIMELINE

#	RECOMMENDATION	CATEGORY	AUDIENCE	TIME FRAME
6.2	Request from the AISD copies of network security plans, which should include topics such as hardware maintenance, including switches and servers; patch maintenance and installation schedules; license agreements with outside vendors; contingency of operation plan, in case of compromise; and backup schedules.	Cybersecurity Prevention	AISD; APD	6 months
6.3	Obtain information from the AISD on how default user accounts are created.	Cybersecurity Prevention	AISD; APD	6 months
6.4	Review the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) outlining seven tenets in a 2021 draft white paper and 2020 publication, which APD may find useful.	Cybersecurity Prevention	APD	6 months
6.5	Consider joining the MS-ISAC, which provides a wealth of information on technology and cyber topics.	Cybersecurity Prevention	APD	6 months
6.6	Consider joining the NCRIC, which provides a wealth of information on technology and cyber topics along with regional training opportunities.	Cybersecurity Prevention	APD	6 months



Antioch, California

Crime Analysis Assessment

August 2022



Submitted by:

Julie Wartell

This project was supported by Grant No. 2019-DG-BX-K001 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART). Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. All rights reserved. Copyright 2022.

The National Public Safety Partnership (PSP) provides coordinated training and technical assistance (TTA) upon request from participating state, local, or tribal law enforcement and prosecution authorities. This assessment report was provided as part of a PSP TTA request and is the sole property of the requesting agency. While PSP participants are encouraged to collaborate with their local, state, and federal law enforcement partners, the dissemination of this report is strictly defined by the requesting agency.

Contents

INTRODUCTION	4
ASSESSMENT PROCESS.....	5
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	5
1. Strategic Planning	6
2. Crime Analysis-Related Products, Services, Data, and Technology	6
3. Staffing and Training	9
4. Marketing and Education	12
CONCLUSION	13
Appendix A: The Assessment Team.....	14
Appendix B: Assessment Interview Schedule/List	15
Appendix C: Suggested Crime Analysis Products	16

INTRODUCTION

As part of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) National Public Safety Partnership (PSP), CNA engaged subject matter expert (SME) Julie Wartell to conduct a crime analysis assessment for the Antioch, California, PSP site. The Antioch Police Department (APD), through Lieutenant John Fortner, requested a crime analysis assessment to receive input on APD's data and technology integration and analysis capacity and to obtain recommendations to enhance crime analysis throughout the agency. APD specifically requested assistance in creating a unit "capable of supporting higher level investigative and operational needs that are proactive, collaborative, and forward-thinking." The department would like its analysts to create and disseminate actionable intelligence products that can support crime reduction efforts.

The city of Antioch has approximately 112,000 residents and is roughly 28 square miles in size. APD has 107 officers, which amounts to less than 1 officer per 1,000 residents, or about half the national average. With such low officer staffing, it is extremely important to have civilian and analytic support and to be as efficient as possible.

APD has two divisions—Field Services and Support Services—that are both led by captains. Field Services includes Patrol, Traffic, and Community Engagement, while Support Services includes Investigations, Records, Dispatch, and Special Operations. Patrol has seven beats broken into sectors with one to two supervisors managing six to seven officers each. Investigations has two bureaus (Persons and Property) with 10 investigators and one sergeant. APD also has a Crime Prevention Commission with seven members appointed by the mayor.

APD employed one crime analyst for many years whose job included many responsibilities besides analysis. This analyst left the department in 2019. In 2020, APD hired two crime analysts and formed a Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) overseen by the Investigations lieutenant. In September 2022, one of the analysts was moved out of the CAU into the Chief's Office. APD analysts handle administrative reporting and some tactical and investigative analysis; one analyst also has been supporting the transition of the department from UCR to NIBRS.¹ IT for APD is handled by the City's Information Systems Department, with two people assigned for hardware and software needs. GIS support is provided by the Public Works Department.

Currently, the Contra Costa County District Attorney's Office (CCCD) does not have analytic capacity, but it was in the process of hiring two analysts at the time of the assessment.

¹ Since the records manager left, a sergeant has been overseeing Records. One analyst has spent considerable time assisting with the transition from UCR to NIBRS. While a huge task, this should not be an ongoing issue once complete.

Ensuring a highly functioning CAU with the appropriate number of qualified personnel is vital to the success of an organization that strives to be data-driven and evidence-based. A national study from 2007 found that “a majority of departments serving 25,000 or more residents used computers in an analytic capacity related to intelligence gathering, crime analysis, analyzing community problems, and crime mapping.”² Fifteen years later, the field of crime analysis has advanced both in technology and practice. Practitioners and researchers agree that effective crime prevention and reduction *cannot* be accomplished without effective crime analysis.³

ASSESSMENT PROCESS

As part of the crime analysis assessment, SME Wartell conducted initial calls in April 2022 with the PSP site team and the PSP site. In addition to calls, SME Wartell reviewed background information from the PSP site, including notes from Antioch PSP meetings, a PSP Site Review PowerPoint presentation, a list of crime analysis products, and the APD website.

SME Wartell conducted the onsite assessment in Antioch from June 2–3, 2022, and met with personnel from APD, the City of Antioch Public Works Department, and CCCDA, as well as two representatives from an APD software vendor (*see Appendix B*).

This report and its recommendations are based on knowledge gained through these interviews and observations. This analysis is informed by research and discussions with people throughout the policing and crime analysis fields on the current state of crime analysis.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of the assessment review, the following observations and recommendations are offered to the Antioch, California, PSP site for consideration. Many of the recommendations were based on or influenced by numerous discussions with APD personnel as well as personnel from the CCCDA and City of Antioch Public Works Department. This assessment report includes general recommendations as well as recommendations specifically relating to:

- Strategic planning
- Crime analysis-related products, services, data, and technology
- Staffing and training

² U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Local Police Departments, 2007, <https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf>.

³ R.B. Santos, “Effectiveness of Crime Analysis for Crime Reduction: Cure or Diagnosis?” *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 30 (2014): 147.

- Marketing and education

SME Wartell believes the following recommendations are critical for effective and successful crime analysis and evaluation. As part of the assessment process, the PSP site team will work with APD to review and prioritize the recommendations as part of an implementation plan that will be tracked through the PSP engagement. ***Training and technical assistance to implement these recommendations are available through PSP upon request.***

1. Strategic Planning

Develop a crime analysis plan

Due to a recent transition of leadership, analysts, and key technology, it is recommended that APD create a crime analysis plan. Having a plan will help the department focus crime analysis efforts and alleviate any confusion on crime analysis-related support in the agency.

Recommendations:

1.1: *Develop a crime analysis plan*

This plan should outline the roles and responsibilities of analysts and sworn managers. It should also include current data and technology used, as well as short- and long-term goals for crime analysis regarding systems, training, and everyday use in APD.

Identify funding sources to support crime analysis

A wide variety of state and federal grants may be available to supplement existing crime analysis resources.

Recommendations:

1.2: *Identify and use grants and other funding sources for crime analysis*

Continually review grant opportunities that may offer overtime for crime analysts, temporary personnel, tools, or research partner assistance. If desired, additional training and technical assistance with this effort can be requested through PSP.

2. Crime Analysis-Related Products, Services, Data, and Technology

Evaluate current products used and their functionality

Currently, the CAU is primarily focused on creating administrative reports, with minimal time available to perform strategic analysis for command staff or to maintain the public-facing website. The unit produces a variety of daily, weekly, and monthly reports, including reports on the following:

- Arrests
- Calls for service
- Certain crimes such as burglaries and shootings
- Missing persons
- Response times
- Traffic collisions
- Top locations and beats
- Prolific DUI offenders

Most of these reports are lists of calls or cases with some statistics or charts.

APD crime analysts use a variety of analysis-related software programs and tools. These include:

- Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD)—Recently moved to Mark43
- Records Management System (RMS)—Recently moved to Mark43
- Esri ArcGIS Suite
- Microsoft Office Suite
- Peregrine (integrates disparate databases and performs queries, reports, and analysis)
- Crystal Reports
- Power BI (in planning)
- Cellebrite
- NIBIN/NESS

Analysts also use several systems for querying, including:

- Aries/CRIMS (County criminal system)
- ShotSpotter
- Vigilant
- Accurint

The data currently used for general analysis are primarily from APD's CAD and RMS, but analysts also use data from other law enforcement systems to query criminal history, warrants, etc. APD analysts do not have laptops that support full analysis capacity outside of the office. The City of Antioch Public Works Department supports some of APD's mapping and spatial data needs.

Recommendations:

2.1: *Evaluate the use of current and potential analysis tools and products*

Consider reviewing the tools and products currently used to determine if and how they are

being used, or if there may be a more efficient tool or method. This review should include databases and spreadsheets that are independently maintained by multiple units (and often redundant). Also consider available technology and tools that could be implemented, especially those that are free or reasonably priced. Some tools to consider are [RFFlow](#) and [Gephi](#) for link and social network analysis and [CrimeStat](#) and the Near Repeat Calculator⁴ for more advanced spatial analysis. Work with IT to evaluate tools being used in other City departments that APD could attach to its licensing.

2.2: ***Provide a variety of products to assist with tactical, strategic, and problem analysis***

Use maps, spreadsheets, and charts to analyze crime patterns and trends, but also expand work on specific problems—people, locations, and calls—that are using considerable agency resources. Diving deeper into and focusing strategies on these persistent problems and locations can enhance effective crime reduction. Officers at all levels should work closely with analysts to ask and answer questions about the problems in their beats, sectors, or investigative areas of focus. Thorough analysis often includes collecting additional data beyond traditional sources. A list of suggested analysis products is included as Appendix C.

2.3: ***Increase the types of data used regularly, and supplement analysis with data beyond traditional internal sources***

While CAD and RMS data are critical for crime analysis, other data can also be very helpful to understand crime problems and create effective strategies. Review what types of data are currently available through city, county, and state departments, such as Fire, EMS, Code Enforcement, and Public Health. See below for a list of recommended data sources for mapping and analysis. Work with the City of Antioch Public Works Department to determine current availability. The recommended datasets may exist in other governmental or private organizations (i.e., licensing), may be available in a spatial format or be able to be converted.

Recommended Additional Datasets

Alcohol licenses	Hotels/motels	Parole/probationers
Convenience stores	Licensees (gun, massage, etc.)	Pawn shops
Halfway houses	Mental health services/shelters	Rental properties

2.4: ***Expand the use of user-friendly mapping and analysis tools***

A common way to create user-friendly mapping and analysis tools is through dashboard

⁴ The Police Foundation, "Tackling Near Repeat Crime," June 2018, https://www.policinginstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/7.-2012-IJ-CX-0039-NRStratBrief_6.29.v3.pdf; Links and more information can be found on the National Policing Institute website at <https://www.policinginstitute.org>.

technology. Assess and develop current and future dashboards, as well as other tools, in conjunction with end users. These tools should be easy to use so officers and other non-analysts can create reports or maps for their beats detailing factors such as top problem places or top offenders. Officers can also use dashboards to review call and crime trends. Creating user-friendly crime analysis tools can serve two purposes: it can enable officers across multiple departments to make the basic maps and reports that they need, and it can free up crime analysts' time to complete more in-depth analysis. In developing these tools, consider current options such as Peregrine or other tools and external resources that may be better options. Work with the City of Antioch Public Works Department on any mapping or spatial tools. Also, supplement any tools developed with training for all users. If desired, additional training and technical assistance with this effort can be requested through PSP.

2.5: ***Create an open data portal or dashboard***

Many police agencies now provide data about calls for service and crime reports to the public through an open data portal. This reduces the number of requests from the public, the media, and other governmental agencies while increasing department transparency. Developing an open data portal or dashboard would be helpful for groups such as APD's Crime Prevention Commission as well. One excellent model is the Portland Police Bureau's [Open Data portal](#), which includes 11 datasets and associated dashboards, all allowing downloads. The Boulder Police Department has also created a [dashboard](#) in conjunction with its open data initiative. The National Policing Institute maintains a list of [open data websites](#) that can be used as a reference.

2.6: ***Automate regular reports***

APD analysts are currently creating and distributing many reports on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual basis. Any reports that are repeated regularly should be automated. This recommendation should only be implemented after conducting a review of all products (*see recommendation 2.1*) and determining which products do not need to be distributed because consumers can obtain their own statistics and maps (*see recommendation 2.5*). Work with internal IT on this automation. If desired, additional training and technical assistance with this effort can be requested through PSP.

3. Staffing and Training

Evaluate and adjust staffing roles and structure

With two analysts, each analyst should have a primary role and a backup role. Analysts should understand each other's needs and products to be able to help when needed. More in-depth

information regarding staffing and structure can be found in the PSP report "Establishing or Enhancing Crime Analysis Capacity."⁵

Recommendations:

3.1: *Fill the recently vacated crime analyst position*

With the size of APD and amount of crime in Antioch, there is a need for two analysts. APD should hire an analyst to replace Lisa, who was recently moved to the Chief's office in a different role. This position should be advertised as soon as possible.

3.2: *Create a primary role and a backup role for each analyst to allow for the efficient use of time and resources*

APD could structure analyst roles with one analyst serving as primary to Investigations and the other serving as primary to Patrol. For administrative requests, internal reports and non-police requests should be automated (*see recommendation 2.6*) or user-driven (*see recommendation 2.4*) to alleviate the time and effort needed from analysts. Analysts should work closely with City of Antioch GIS personnel on data, systems, and training.

Evaluate training opportunities and professional development avenues

Train analysts on data, tools, techniques, applied crime theory concepts, and problem-solving concepts. In addition, on-the-job and continuous refresher training is extremely important. Participating in formalized networks, meetings, and centralized groups can help analysts share trends, common problems, and resources.

Recommendations:

3.3: *Encourage APD analysts to participate in training and networking opportunities*

Encourage and support analysts to participate in outside training with the appropriate budget allocated. This training should include topic-specific conferences, publication purchases, and hands-on training (especially for software and tools already accessible by APD). [The International Association of Crime Analysts](#) is an excellent resource for training options, from publications to webinars or in-person training. Other excellent, free crime analysis resources include Arizona State University Center for Problem-Oriented Policing publications⁶ and BJA's

⁵ Julie Wartell and Jessica Herbert, "Crime Analysis Considerations for Establishing or Enhancing Capacity," National Public Safety Partnership, April 2020, <https://www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/Clearinghouse/Resource/871/PSP-Research-Brief-Crime-Analysis-Considerations-for-Establishing-or-Enhancing-Capacity>.

⁶ Arizona State University Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, *Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps*, <https://popcenter.asu.edu/learning/60steps/>; John E. Eck and Ronald V. Clarke, *Intelligence Analysis for Problem Solvers*, Arizona State University Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, <https://popcenter.asu.edu/sites/default/files/library/reading/PDFs/Intell-Analysis-for-ProbSolvers.pdf>; Arizona State University Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, "Problem Specific Guides," <https://popcenter.asu.edu/pop-guides>.

[Analysis Toolkit](#). APD analysts should continue participating with the Bay Area Crime and Intelligence Analysts Association and work in collaboration with the new CCCDA analysts. APD should support crime analysis personnel to actively participate in associations in California and internationally as well.

Other relevant associations, listservs, and mailings include:

- [National Policing Institute](#)
- [Urban Institute Justice Policy Center](#)
- [Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy](#)
- [Harvard University Data-Smart City Solutions](#)

Develop pipelines for volunteers and interns

Interns and volunteers are excellent sources of free or inexpensive assistance and can be a consistent asset to crime analysis. Numerous local colleges and universities have relevant programs and students who would be interested and capable. For volunteers, consider the local community or retirement groups. Look for people with experience or interest in supporting crime analysis or direct experience with patrol, investigations, community engagement, and crime prevention relating to data and analysis.

Recommendations:

- 3.4: ***Identify local colleges and universities as potential partners for an internship program to provide consistent support for the CAU***
- 3.5: ***Look to local community and retirement groups for volunteers who may have experience and interest in supporting crime analysis or data and analysis work in other parts of APD***

Develop partnerships with academic institutions and researchers

External researchers can bring scientific expertise, national experience, and potential grants that require research partners.

Recommendations:

- 3.6: ***Create partnerships with academic institutions and researchers***

The Bay Area has numerous options for researchers, but also consider non-local researchers who have expertise in specific subject areas you want to explore. For instance, UC Davis hosts the [California Firearm Violence Research Center](#).

4. Marketing and Education

Create agency awareness of the CAU's crime analysis capacity

After conducting a review of the tools and products APD currently uses (*see recommendation 2.1*), the CAU should develop and distribute two lists of accessible data and product/tool examples—one specifically for analysts and an abridged version for the agency. The abridged list should be shared via email or the police network, so all personnel are aware of available tools.

Recommendations:

- 4.1: ***In collaboration with end users, have the CAU develop two lists of accessible data, products, tools, and applications and how they are used***

The detailed list of data and products for analysts should include the type of data file (e.g., geographic versus database) and its source and attributes, plus its timeframe and mechanism for updates and access list. This data list will help people serving in backup roles, interns, or new personnel working in the CAU better use APD data sources. The abridged list for the agency should contain examples of the CAU's common products and capabilities, including product or application names, included data, and how the product or data can be used.

Increase the use of crime analysis products by department personnel, including Patrol, Investigations, Community Engagement, and Command staff

Officers at all levels across the agency are unaware of what the CAU can provide (or potentially provide). The CAU should make a concerted effort to show how its analysis products are helpful to patrol officers, detectives, and other staff.

Recommendations:

- 4.2: ***Have analysts from the CAU participate in patrol briefings, detective meetings, and ride-alongs on a regular basis (at least once per month) to maintain rapport with end users and market CAU abilities***

During these interactions, crime analysts should listen to officer needs, share information and successes, and encourage officers who are already crime analysis-knowledgeable to be "champions" for the CAU. Officers should also work on a problem or project with analysts to learn about the data, products, and services that CAU can provide.

- 4.3: ***Consider providing training for police managers on crime analysis. Training could include a custom session provided by a PSP SME, a crime analysis training or***

conference, or the Crime Analysis for Executives webinar.⁷

PSP can provide an SME to present and facilitate a discussion on crime analysis—specifically, how it can be best used in APD. Crime analysis trainings and conferences may offer managers a view into what other agencies are doing and how they are supported by leadership. The webinar provides insight on how a crime analyst can support chiefs, sheriffs, and other police executives or managers with strategic or tactical decision-making. Topics include what to expect from a crime analyst; how to make effective use of crime analysis; how to support and manage crime analysts, including staffing levels and placement; methods to improve data quality, including necessary tools and training; and RMS and CAD connectivity.

CONCLUSION

APD has had at least one crime analyst for many years. In the last two years, crime analysis has become a larger priority for the department. With new leadership and analysts, there now exists a prime opportunity to examine and enhance the department's analytic capacity and support. Implementing the recommendations in this report will support all levels of the organization, from Patrol to Investigations to Administration, to maximize available data and technology to provide effective analytic assistance for crime reduction and prevention.

⁷ National Public Safety Partnership, "Crime Analysis for Executives," <https://www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/Webinars-And-Podcasts/crime-analysis-for-executives>.

Appendix A: The Assessment Team

Julie Wartell has spent over 25 years working with local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies and communities around crime analysis, research, and prevention, including serving as a crime analyst for police and prosecution, managing a regional crime mapping initiative, conducting research and evaluation for nonprofits, serving as a National Institute of Justice fellow, and serving as an independent advisor. Julie has performed a wide range of research and analysis of crime problems, conducted studies of police and prosecutor processes, and assessed information technologies used in crime analysis. She has delivered extensive training and presentations to officers, prosecutors, analysts, and community members internationally on topics relating to analyzing crime and problem-solving. Julie has edited or authored numerous publications and teaches and conducts research at the University of California–San Diego. She has an MPA from San Diego State and a postgraduate diploma in applied criminology and police management from the University of Cambridge.

Appendix B: Assessment Interview Schedule/List

Antioch Police Department personnel

- Acting Chief Steven Ford
- Captain Anthony Morefield
- Lieutenants John Fortner and Desmond Bittner
- Sergeant Mike Mellone (Records)
- Corporal Adrian Gonzales (Technology/R&D)
- Detective/Officer Ashley Ewart (Patrol/Investigations)
- Crime Analysts Mike Rainey and Lisa Reinke

City of Antioch GIS Coordinator Brandon Peters

Contra Costa County Deputy District Attorney Devon Bell

Software Vendor (Peregrine) Representatives Aakash Pattabi and Chris Harper

Appendix C: Suggested Crime Analysis Products

1. Beat analysis—Maps, statistics, and relevant information for each beat updated quarterly or at shift change, at a minimum
2. Internal and external dashboards to analyze crime and call data trends by district, shift, days, or week(s) without needing to request a report from a crime analyst
3. Bulletins (such as for crime series, trends, and patterns; people of interest; and target areas)
4. Top calls for service (citizen-generated)—Locations, types, days, times, and related factors
5. Top offender maps/lists—Using a data-driven approach to identify and visualize (such as with social network analysis)
6. Analysis of traffic collisions—Where, when, and why, as well as other relevant factors (crosswalks, lighting, etc.)
7. Analysis of parolees and probationers in relation to crime series and patterns
8. Analysis of homeless-related problems
9. Frequent brokers at pawn shops and their connections to burglaries and vehicle break-ins
10. Analysis of NIBIN leads and other gun-related data—People, incidents, and places
11. Analysis of ShotSpotter activations



Nonfatal Shooting and Gun Violence Reduction Assessment

Antioch Police Department

May 2023



BJA
Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice

MANAGED BY
IIR
Institute for Intergovernmental Research

**Antioch, California,
Police Department**

**Nonfatal Shooting and Gun Violence
Reduction Assessment**

**Prepared by
Institute for Intergovernmental Research
Nonfatal Shooting Team
Brian Russell, Team Lead
With
Warren Brewer
Matt Clark
Paul Formolo
Joe McHale**

May 2023

Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	4
The Assessment Process	4
The Cost of Gun Violence	6
Observations.....	8
Recommendation 1	11
Action Steps.....	11
Discussion	12
Recommendation 2	14
Action Steps.....	14
Discussion	15
Recommendation 3	16
Action Steps.....	16
Discussion	17
Recommendation 4.....	18
Action Steps	18
Discussion	18
Closing.....	20
Next Steps.....	20
Appendix A—NFS Team Bios	21
Appendix B—Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Public Safety Briefing.....	26
Appendix C—Phoenix Police Department Police Civilian Investigator Job Description	28
Appendix D—Richmond Police Department R.E.S.E.T. Model	32
Appendix E—Training Resources	35
Appendix F—Endnotes.....	37

Executive Summary

The Assessment Process

Under the oversight of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), a nonfatal shooting (NFS) investigations assessment was undertaken at the request of the Antioch, California, Police Department (APD), a National Public Safety Partnership (PSP) site. Through PSP, the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR) offers NFS assessments to sites to support their efforts to enhance the quality of NFS investigations and reduce gun violence. These assessments provide evidence-based recommendations and suggestions that focus on improving productivity while using the agencies' existing resources. Conducted by a team of subject-matter experts (SMEs) from IIR, this assessment supports the APD's gun violence enforcement and prevention efforts by examining the agency's response to NFS offenses.

Prior to the on-site visit, the APD completed a pre-visit survey and provided the assessment team with relevant documents such as crime data, calls for service, case management systems, intelligence sharing, policies, and procedures. Once on-site, the SMEs observed relevant processes and conducted 27 discrete interviews with key personnel at the requesting agency, including investigative, patrol, crime lab, crime analysis, and training staff members. Additional interviews were conducted with representatives from relevant federal, state, and local partners, such as the Contra Costa County District Attorney's Office; the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); the California Department of Corrections Probation and Parole; the Contra Costa County District Attorney's Office, Office of Victim Witness Services; and an Antioch Community Focus Group.

The observations and recommendations in this report are derived from the interviews and thorough reviews of agency policies, case files, and crime analysis products; observations taken from interviews are reported in the aggregate. The recommendations in this report are a composite of crime science, management studies, and recognized best practices and informed by interviews and reviews of case files, crime analysis products, and APD policies.

"Efficiency is about doing the same with less . . . productivity is about doing more with the same."¹

**—"Great Companies Obsess Over Productivity, Not Efficiency,"
Harvard Business Review**

The goal of this assessment is to provide evidence-based or best practice recommendations that are practical and within the immediate means of the agency. Anticipated outcomes include implementation of new practices, identification of relevant benchmarks to measure progress, and increased public safety and community support. For this assessment, an NFS offense is defined as an incident involving "criminal intent, a weapon with a powder discharge, and a penetrating wound from a firearm."²

When Frederick Taylor published his *Principles of Scientific Management* in 1911, he proposed that reorganizing work processes would increase productivity. A century and thousands of books later,³ Michael Mankins and Eric Garton reported that “the average company loses over 20% of its productive power to organizational drag—all the practices, procedures, and structures that waste time and limit output.”⁴ This report identifies “organizational drags” and provides recommendations—that are within the capacity of the APD—to mitigate or eliminate their impact on NFS investigations.

NFS assessments focus on identifying anomalies and nonproductive norms, with less attention paid to the positive attributes and productive work of the agency. Readers are urged to take this into consideration and to recognize that changes may have taken place in the interim.

In nearly all cases, an NFS is a failed murder attempt; offenders seldom shoot to wound, nor fire warning shots. The difference between life and death is often a matter of inches; survival depends on circumstances independent of the shooter’s intent: wound placement, malfunctioning weapons, poor marksmanship, or immediate access to quality medical care.⁵

The Cost of Gun Violence

Reaching far beyond the immediate threat to public and officer safety, unsolved NFS investigations generate outcomes that are deleterious, long-term, and far-reaching. They undermine police legitimacy, increase neighborhood fear, erode informal social controls, and leave individuals who commit gun crimes—many with substantial criminal histories—free to reoffend or become victims in an endless cycle of retaliation.

“Many of the people in these blocks live in terror. The sound of gunshots is common, sometimes coming multiple times a day. Parents worry that their kids could be next, and young people fear for their own lives.”⁶

Unsolved NFS offenses also give rise to community questions about the capacity, competence, and fairness of the criminal justice system; encourage citizens to take self-protective actions (e.g., arming themselves); and discourage cooperation with police and prosecutors.

High-gun-violence neighborhoods tangibly demonstrate William Spelman and John Eck’s repeat victimization research, which shows that 10 percent of the victims are involved in about 40 percent of victimizations, 10 percent of the individuals committing crimes are responsible for more than 50 percent of crimes, and 10 percent of the places are the sites of about 60 percent of crimes.⁷

Beyond the suffering of victims and their families, low gun crime clearance rates exact substantial costs from communities in lower property values, higher insurance premiums, and reduced investment. In a report summarizing high-quality cost-of-crime research, the RAND Corporation calculated that on average, one murder imposes \$9,081,677 in concrete and intangible costs and that investments in law enforcement would produce tangible and beneficial returns.⁸

Another study, conducted by the Urban Institute, determined that “an increase in gun homicides or gunfire in neighborhoods can lower the number of retail and service business establishments, the number of new jobs created, and the volume of sales in business establishments.”⁹

Gun violence also imposes substantial medical costs that are “often absorbed by the public either as uncompensated treatment for the uninsured or through Medicaid.”¹⁰ In a study released by the Stanford Medical School in March 2017, researchers conducted “an analysis of data from 267,265 patients who were admitted for firearm-related injuries during the nine-year period (2006–2014) . . . [and] reported that \$6.6 billion is only a fraction of the total hospital costs incurred by gunshot wounds: It does not include costs of emergency room visits—medical costs for patients who are treated and released or those who are treated but die before admission—or hospital readmissions . . . and government bears 40 percent of the costs.”¹¹

This data, while pertinent to the national discussion, is difficult to apply to local law enforcement budget and resource decisions. For local purposes, *back-of-the-envelope* calculations can approximate, in local dollars, the costs of gun crime imposed on law enforcement resources by multiplying gun violence calls-for-service time by median patrol officer salaries to provide the *minimal* dollar cost of the patrol response. Time and salary cost calculations pertaining to investigative, forensic, and tactical functions of the agency will provide a deeper understanding.

Observations

APD command staff presented an opening briefing to the assessment team. The command staff explained that the APD is in a transition period after the recent hiring of a new police chief from outside the agency.

Resources within the APD have been strained because of numerous separations, retirements, and injuries. The department is authorized to have 115 sworn members and may carry six additional sworn officers (121 total) as over-hires to provide immediate relief when officers separate from the agency.

Antioch has been hit especially hard by an increase in the number of sworn officers on limited duty resulting from an on-duty injury. At the time of the assessment, 17 sworn members were not available to work because of a duty-related injury. Currently, between the vacant positions and officers on long-term injury status, the department has 78 working sworn members, including the command staff. As a result, the agency has shuttered proactive units. There are also vacancies in each of the investigative teams. The department is constantly in a state of hiring new employees and is generally onboarding basic recruit officers with no prior law enforcement experience. It was estimated that the average tenure for a patrol officer is one to three years of service. In addition to vacancies in the sworn ranks, the agency is lacking in sufficient professional staff (non-sworn) personnel to support the agency and free officers for other tasks. The agency currently employs one crime analyst, who has an overwhelming number of collateral responsibilities.

The members of the APD embrace the challenges they face and work to overcome these hurdles by investing in their staff and utilizing technology as a force multiplier to create efficiencies. The department allows investigators to complete relevant training courses through the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training and has invested in current technology, including Cellebrite, GrayKey, and CellHawk. The department is also preparing to launch ShotSpotter technology, which will blanket nearly four square miles of the city and provide patrol officers with immediate notification of gunfire within the coverage zone.

The crime trends in the city of Antioch were often described as “transitory.” It was explained that individuals who commit crimes in Antioch are often affiliated with gangs in neighboring communities. These individuals commonly stay with or visit family in Antioch or use the city as a pass-through to another location when they commit their crimes.

The APD's Investigations Unit is staffed with eleven detectives, two sergeants, and one lieutenant. The movement from patrol officer to detective is a lateral movement, and the assignment to a detective position is not permanent. Investigators are assigned for a period of three years and may be extended twice for one additional year, for a total of five years. At the conclusion of a detective's time in Investigations, the detective either rotates back to a patrol assignment or promotes to the rank of sergeant. Detectives specialize in certain types of criminal investigations and attend appropriate training based upon their assignment. Detectives work a ten-hour day shift Monday through Thursday, and on occasion, detectives may respond to an NFS incident. The condition of the shooting victim will determine if there is a response from Investigations. If the victim is going to survive, patrol will handle the investigation. A crime scene log is only used for homicide and very serious NFS shootings. The specific assignments within the unit are detailed in the table below:

Crime Type	Detectives
Robbery/Homicide	4
Domestic Violence	1
Sex Crimes	2
Property Crimes	2
General Assignment	2

The APD's definition of an NFS is injury as a result of the use of a firearm.

The APD explained to the assessment team that it is difficult to pull the NFS data from the current record management system. The APD completed a hand data search to identify the NFS cases, which average 35 per year.

The APD does not track NFS clearance rates; however, it is anticipated that the department clears approximately 15 percent of NFSs with an arrest.

Numerous interviews indicated that interpersonal disputes, small group conflicts, and simmering tensions instigated by provocative social media posts are major drivers of gun violence in Antioch. Victims and witnesses are often reluctant to cooperate, and in many cases, "today's shooter is tomorrow's victim."

It was reported that 60–70 percent of guns recovered in Antioch are Polymer80s (ghost guns).

California Probation and Parole routinely exchanges information with the APD regarding clients involved in homicides and NFS incidents and will place custody holds on clients when requested by the APD.

The APD indicated that there is lag time with the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN). Generally, there is a one-month turnaround, but a special request can be made for a rush entry. A rush entry is about a one-week turnaround.

The APD recognizes that it can do a better job in communicating effectively within the community after a traumatic incident such as a homicide or NFS.

Training needs cited by agency staff were NIBIN, social network analysis, firearms identification, gun offender investigations/interviews, interdiction training, building searches, cell phone exploitation, active shooter tactics, and basic investigation skills for precinct investigators.

The APD recently underwent a crime analysis assessment as part of the PSP program.

Recommendation 1

The APD should consider creating a Gun Violence Team (GVT) investigative unit with the primary purpose of responding to homicides and bullet-piercing-skin incidents by utilizing existing agency assets to employ an offender-based, intelligence-led gun violence response.

Why? Committing designated investigative GVT units to respond to and investigate homicides and NFSs will streamline investigative responsibilities and enhance the proficient use of crime gun intelligence. This will increase communication, collaboration, and cooperation to prevent retaliatory violence.

The APD should consider realigning the present Investigative Unit structure to form a GVT unit consisting of one sergeant and six investigators. The present four investigators assigned to robbery/homicide investigations would be teamed with the present two general assignment investigators to investigate homicides and NFS offenses meeting one or more of the following criteria:

- Offense circumstances exhibit a clear disregard for public safety (as determined by the APD), to include homicides, robberies, aggravated assaults in which death is likely, and any offense involving the use of firearms.
- Offense involves a suspect, witness, or group of standing investigative interest.
- Offense circumstances suggest a drug trafficking or group activity nexus.
- NIBIN hit links the firearm to one or more previous shooting incidents.

The APD should also consider assigning a designated crime analyst to the GVT.

Action Steps

Short-Term Implementation (one to two months)

- Identify peak times (hours of the day and days of the week) for felonious crimes against persons.
- Adjust staffing schedules to provide an on-scene investigative presence during peak major crime periods.
- Consider assigning the six GVT investigators to a work a rotating day and evening schedule.
- Conduct a temporal analysis of Antioch gun violence; at a minimum, schedule one GVT two-investigator team to respond immediately to homicides and NFS offenses.

Mid-Term Implementation (three to five months)

- Incorporate retaliatory violence screening into on-scene preliminary investigations to identify suspects, confederates, potential victims, or neighborhoods where retaliatory violence might take place.
- Reinforce the critical role of patrol in achieving quality investigative outcomes. Provide refresher major crime preliminary investigation training to patrol officers and supervisors; include scene security/containment, witness management, and the NIBIN program.
- Emphasize in roll call briefings and training sessions the importance of recovering casings from scenes involving firearm discharges. Install a feedback process to provide examples of investigations in which patrol officers were essential to identifying prolific shooters and clearing gun violence offenses. Notify patrol officers about NIBIN leads associated with their beat areas.

Long-Term Implementation (six months to one year)

- Access the PSP Virtual Academy for no-cost training courses relevant to NFS investigations and violent crime. *Law Enforcement Guide to Crime Guns*, *Navigating NIBIN Leads via the GETS System*, and *Crime S.C.E.N.E. Excellence* are three courses with specific relevance to personnel.
- The crime analyst should be utilized to create link analyses between related cases with common persons, locations, vehicles, and guns. The analyst should also generate victimology reports on all cases to uncover relationships to past incidents and potential perpetrators.
- Consider a more active Victim Witness Assistance role during NFS investigations.

Discussion

In theory and practice, the proposed GVT unit aligns with social and crime science research, surveys of law enforcement organizations, and management studies of private sector businesses and of law enforcement agencies maintaining 80 percent or higher homicide clearance rates.

Staffing the GVT unit with investigators with crimes-against-persons experience and expertise applies a multivariate response to circumstances most likely to generate gun violence: group conflicts, drug trafficking disputes, and rip-offs.

The practices of high-quality murder investigations are applicable to NFS investigations. A recent study of Boston clearance rates disclosed that “the large gap in clearances (43% for gun murders vs. 19% for nonfatal gun assaults) is primarily a result of sustained investigative effort in homicide cases made after the first 2 days.”¹²

Crime science research and best practice studies suggest that scene-to-prosecution investigative policies enhance clearance rates. Every high-performing agency in the *Homicide Process*

Mapping: Best Practices for Increasing Homicide Clearances project had scene-to-prosecution policies with investigator schedules corresponding to peak periods of gun violence, and an investigator arriving on-scene within 30 minutes of the offense contributes to higher clearance rates.¹³

A clearance rate trajectory analysis of the largest 100 law enforcement agencies “revealed substantial variations in clearance rate trends over time across these agencies, with some performing consistently well above or well below national average.” Factors contributing to high clearance rates included structured oversight of investigative functions, specific performance metrics, and on-scene investigator presence shortly after the offense was reported. The study also reported that “for both aggravated assaults and robbery, the presence of an investigative supervisor at the scene may also lead to an increased likelihood that cases will be resolved.”

In economic modeling, path dependence theory¹⁴ describes circumstances in which past actions control future outcomes. NFS preliminary investigations that leave important, time-sensitive tasks undone (e.g., evidence and witness canvasses, documenting/collecting CCTV coverage, recording vehicle registration plates) create negative path dependencies that frustrate follow-up investigations. GVT unit scheduling that corresponds to peak gun violence periods will forestall negative dependencies, improve solvability assessments, and provide a tangible representation of the APD commitment to neighborhood safety.

After a spatial analysis of 314 homicides, the Boston Police Department reorganized the homicide unit to include direct investigative support, provide victim-witness services, acquired specialized training, and deployed an updated 40-hour crime scene response and investigation in-service training. The result: a 9.8 percent increase in homicide clearance rates and an 18.4 percent increase in adjusted homicide clearance rates (including cases awaiting a grand jury).¹⁵

In sum, prompt on-scene arrival and scene-to-prosecution policies instill investigative ownership (considered critically important by high-performing agencies), establish accountability, facilitate case management processes, and employ experienced investigators to interview reluctant witnesses or victims while on-scene or at a medical facility.

“To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.”

Sir Robert Peel, *7th Principle of Policing*, 1829

Recommendation 2

Increase internal and external information sharing and collaborative problem solving.

Why? When law enforcement leadership teams share information and build relationships with their federal counterparts and community partners, they use resources more productively, enhance community relations, and increase the public's confidence in law enforcement.

Action Steps

Short-Term Implementation (one to two months)

- Conduct APD biweekly shoot reviews on NFS offenses and homicides. Consider triaging for shootings with a high risk of retaliation, shootings with a known suspect, incidents in gun violence hot spots, and unique circumstances identified by the APD. See the Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Public Safety Briefing triaging criteria in Appendix B.

Mid-Term Implementation (two to five months)

- Establish a quarterly federal partner meeting to allocate enforcement and investigative responsibilities based on agency expertise, anticipated state or federal outcome, availability of resources, and time expectations of the anticipated effort.
- Develop an APD basic investigations training course; provide this training for new investigators. Consider a multiagency training event for law enforcement agencies to enhance collaboration and information sharing.

Long-Term Implementation (six months to one year)

- Reinvigorate information sharing and compliance monitoring partnerships with California Probation and Parole authorities. Consider a focused deterrence program—like Rockford, Illinois—to address individuals returning from correctional institutions.¹⁶ In this effort, include local prosecution, city social services, faith-based organizations, relevant nonprofit groups, and federal law enforcement and prosecution authorities.¹⁷

Discussion

While there is no single solution or a “one-stop” agency able to reduce chronic gun violence, successful policing initiatives begin by identifying the places prone to violence and the individuals and groups responsible for the violence. Executive meeting groups that share information to make enforcement decisions based on agency expertise, anticipated state or federal outcome, availability of resources, and time expectations are more likely to succeed at removing high-risk individuals and violent groups from Antioch neighborhoods.

Shooting reviews have not been rigorously evaluated. Models vary, and it is not clear whether one is better than another.¹⁸ However, absent clear goals, the value of problem-solving and quality control processes is diluted when reviews turn into recitation exercises. Triaging can forestall this decay when centered on shootings with a high risk of retaliation, incidents with a known suspect, incidents in gun violence hot spots, and unique circumstances identified by the APD.

A meta-analysis study found that focused deterrence strategies were successful and associated with statistically significant crime reductions.¹⁹ When focused deterrence programs are successful, they are usually composed of a broad band of partnerships and offer both negative and positive incentives to discourage criminal behavior.²⁰

Numerous studies show that crime usually clusters in small, identifiable areas (hot spots) and is generally committed by a small number of individuals. Patrol actions, when based on crime analysis, deploy scarce resources at the right times in the right places and increase the department’s effectiveness and productivity. Interestingly, in a phenomenon not fully explained but frequently experienced, hot spot policing does not usually displace crime to other areas. Crime is reduced, not displaced, and the reductions tend to be long-lasting. Frequently, hot spot policing creates a “diffusion of benefits” that widens crime reductions more broadly.²¹

Recommendation 3

The APD should consider utilizing civilian personnel to assist investigators.

Why? The fundamental principle for this recommendation is that the civilian personnel can perform a variety of tasks of a police nature in support of law enforcement activities.

Action Steps

Long-Term Implementation (six months to one year)

The civilian personnel would perform a variety of tasks of a police nature in support of law enforcement activities within the APD. Assignments may include investigative or support responsibilities and may vary by position. These would be non-sworn, unarmed positions within the APD. See the Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department Police Civilian Police Investigator Job Description in Appendix C for an example of this type of position.

The responsibility of the civilian personnel would include the following:

- Processing crime scenes.
- Authoring original and supplemental incident reports.
- Conducting follow-up phone calls, emails, and in-person contacts with members of the public, law enforcement, and various investigative partners.
- Collecting data or information from various sources (computerized crime and traffic databases, etc.).
- Contacting other law enforcement agencies, probation officers, etc. for additional information and utilizing automated systems to research criminal history and conduct background checks.
- Conducting interviews with victims, witnesses, and suspects at the request of a detective or supervisor.
- Assisting sworn investigators in authoring and reviewing court orders and search warrants and completing required paperwork, evidence impounds, etc.
- Creating investigative support material, such as photographic line-ups, crime bulletins, flyers, etc.
- Reviewing various reports on impounded evidence for the purpose of property purges, crime analysis, pended lab results, etc.

Discussion

This will benefit investigators by transferring responsibilities from the investigators to civilian personnel. The result would be lower investigator caseloads, thus providing investigators more time to follow up on investigative leads.

A peer exchange between the APD and the Phoenix Police Department to evaluate the Phoenix Civilian Police Investigator program is recommended.

Recommendation 4

Increase community engagement programs and activities.

Why? This is important because it increases the transparency of a city's efforts to address gun crime and contributes to enhancing their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Genuine efforts to enhance community engagement will foster trust and confidence in the police. This could discourage retaliatory violence while encouraging citizens to cooperate in the criminal justice process, including notifying the police when shootings occur and participating in investigations and prosecutions as witnesses or victims. Victim or witness cooperation is critical in shooting investigations, and improving cooperation can help with low closure rates.

Action Steps

Enhance or create engagement programs that include information to empower community member efforts to reduce the prevalence of crime guns in the community.

Mid-to-Long-Term Implementation (three months to one year)

- Create a program based on the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department Rapid Engagement of Support in the Event of Trauma (R.E.S.E.T.) model by adding Antioch social service agencies, nonprofit organizations, and faith-based organizations to post-offense walk-throughs. (See Appendix D for information on the R.E.S.E.T. program.) Conduct neighborhood walk-throughs within 72 hours of a homicide or serious NFS offense. These will provide a visible manifestation of the APD's commitment to public safety. 22
- Utilize APD community partners, Family Justice Center resources, and the APD's police information officer in the application of Community Violence Intervention (CVI) programs.

Discussion

Augmenting the APD investigations with neighborhood walk-throughs can reduce neighborhood fear, prevent retaliatory offenses, manifest the APD safe neighborhood commitment, and build confidence in the rule of law. For more information about other post-offense models from Chattanooga, Tennessee; Los Angeles, California; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Providence, Rhode Island; Richmond, Virginia; and San Diego, California, see the Urban Institute's *Responding to Homicide and Shooting Scenes: A Review of Procedural Justice Practice in the U.S.*²³

Research suggests that CVI programs are successful when they are tightly focused, effectively communicated, and adequately resourced, involving partnerships with public, private, and faith-based service organizations.²⁴

Additional information on CVI programs is discussed in the National Criminal Justice Association's *An Overview: Community Violence Intervention Strategy*²⁵ and the RAND Corporation's Better Policing Toolkit's *Focused Deterrence in Depth*.²⁶

Closing

The recommendations in this report are based on a composite of crime science, management studies, and recognized best practices. Information collected during the assessment was helpful in forming the recommendations; the team deeply appreciates the candor and patience of APD personnel who participated.

Fully confident in APD competency and professionalism, the team sought to offer evidence-based solutions that are practical, within the current capacity of the agency, and, if fully implemented, likely to produce gun violence reductions.

Next Steps

- Upon submission of the report to the APD, IIR will work with the APD to set up and conduct a follow-up meeting with the APD strategic site liaison, the program advisor, IIR staff, and SMEs to discuss the report.
- The PSP team will work with the APD to implement recommendations that have been selected by the APD.
- IIR will be responsive to requests for PSP-sponsored peer exchanges to learn about strategies or procedures referenced in the report.
- Upon request, IIR will coordinate enrollment in the PSP Virtual Academy to provide no-cost training opportunities related to NFS investigations.
- IIR can provide toolkits on specific areas of interest related to the NFS assessment report for distribution to key personnel or partners.

Appendix A—NFS Team Bios



Brian E. Russell
Deputy Director/Assistant Chief
Bureau of Investigative Operations
Virginia Department Juvenile Justice Services

Brian E. Russell serves as the deputy chief of investigations with the Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice. In this position, he oversees investigations involving criminal, Prison Rape Elimination Act, and gang activities of juveniles who are under the care of the Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice.

In 2011, Mr. Russell retired from the Richmond, Virginia, Police Department as the captain and commander over the Major Crimes Division. Before his promotion to captain, he served five years as the officer in charge of the Homicide Unit. His past supervisory experience includes uniform operations, robbery, aggravated assault/sex crimes, the Firearm and Fugitive Task Force, youth and family crimes, arson, the Community Response Team, property crimes, and the Training Development Unit.

Mr. Russell is a 36-year veteran and served in the Organized Crime Division's Narcotics Unit for 11 years. His assignments included the coordination of undercover operations, long-term historical drug cases, and political corruption.

Other assignments have included long-term undercover, uniform, special operations, street crimes, the Metropolitan Richmond Multi-Jurisdictional Narcotics Task Force, violent crime, and the U.S. Attorney's Office Political Corruption Task Force.

Mr. Russell has instructed for the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services Drug Cadre for the past 36 years and at the national level for the past 10 years. Courses instructed have included Fourth Amendment issues, undercover and narcotics investigations, managing and conducting homicide investigations, chain of command, using social media to aid investigations, law enforcement leadership, media relations, problem solving, family and community management, and intelligence-led policing. He assisted in authoring the Basic and Advanced Undercover Investigators Training Manuals used by the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services.

From 2010 to the present, the Bureau of Justice Assistance has asked Mr. Russell to participate on a homicide unit assessment team that has conducted several assessments and has provided training at the conclusions of those assessments. In 2013, the Office of Justice Programs asked Mr. Russell to conduct several assessments of homicide units. Also in 2013, Mr. Russell assisted in the project that resulted in the publication of the Homicide Process Mapping: Best Practices for Increasing Homicide Clearances resource.

Mr. Russell holds a master's degree from Old Dominion University and a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from the State University of New York at Buffalo.

Warren V. Brewer

Commander, Violent Crimes Bureau

Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department

Commander Warren V. Brewer is the commander of the Violent Crimes Bureau in the Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department (PD). Commander Brewer provides leadership to 192 employees who are dispersed throughout the Homicide, Robbery, Assaults, Crime Gun Intelligence, Digital Forensic Imaging, and Night Detectives Units. He oversees multiple aspects of addressing violent crime in a city of 1.7 million people.

Commander Brewer has an extensive investigative background in internal and criminal investigations. As a detective, he has investigated numerous high-profile homicides, armed robberies, and crimes-against-children incidents. As a sergeant, he supervised a patrol squad in the Patrol Division and detective squads in the Investigations Division, and he conducted internal investigations in the Management Services Division. As a lieutenant, he was a night duty commander in the Patrol Division, an investigative lieutenant in the Investigations Division, and a lieutenant at the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC), overseeing the Intelligence section of the Homeland Defense Bureau.

Prior to his assignment in the Violent Crimes Bureau, Commander Brewer served as the highest-ranking officer for the Phoenix PD during nighttime hours and was responsible for all police operations during those hours. Commander Brewer is also one of the Phoenix PD's site representatives for the National Public Safety Partnership.

Commander Brewer has 24 years of law enforcement service with the Phoenix PD. He holds a master's degree in educational leadership from Northern Arizona University.

Matt Clark

Commander

Denver, Colorado, Police Department, Major Crimes Division

Commander Matt Clark has been with the Denver, Colorado, Police Department for 22 years. He has served in a variety of assignments within the Patrol, Investigations, and Internal Affairs Divisions. Commander Clark is currently assigned as the commander of the Denver Police Department's Major Crimes Division. In that position, he oversees the operations of the Homicide, Sex Crimes, Special Victims, Domestic Violence, Fraud, Child Abuse, Firearm Assault Shoot Team, and Night Shift Units as well as several task forces. Commander Clark has extensive experience instructing police academy recruits and providing continuing education in various topics including critical incident investigations, criminal procedure, and complex criminal investigations. He currently works with the Federal Bureau of Investigation Rocky Mountain

Command College and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs providing instruction to local or foreign law enforcement officers.

Commander Clark is recognized as a subject-matter expert related to the management of complex criminal investigations, police shooting/critical incident investigations and use-of-force incidents. He has worked with the Police Executive Research Forum and Major Cities Chiefs Association to establish best practices for homicide/cold case investigations and critical incident investigative protocols. He routinely works with policy makers, legislators, and other elected officials to review and make recommendations on proposed legislation related to criminal law and criminal procedure. Commander Clark earned a bachelor of science degree in criminal justice and law enforcement administration from Colorado State University and is currently working toward a master's degree in the same field of study. He also completed the International Association of Chiefs of Police's Leadership in Police Organizations course and the Police Executive Research Forum's Senior Management Institute for Police.

Paul Formolo

Assistant Chief, Criminal Investigation Bureau Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Police Department

Assistant Chief Paul Formolo oversees the Criminal Investigation Bureau for the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Police Department, where he has served for over 25 years. Assistant Chief Formolo has an extensive background in homicide and nonfatal shooting investigations. During his career, he has accumulated over ten years of experience with investigating and directly supervising homicide cases. In addition, for three years, he commanded the department's Violent Crimes Division, which is responsible for investigating hundreds of nonfatal shootings annually. In 2018, Assistant Chief Formolo played a major role in developing and operationalizing the department's Shoot Review Program, which was just recently renamed the Public Safety Review. This review primarily focuses on homicides and nonfatal shootings with the intent to deter retaliation and identify root causes of violence by collaborating with our criminal justice system partners and other community stakeholders.

Assistant Chief Formolo is also a retired U.S. Army First Sergeant and earned a bachelor of applied science degree in criminal justice from the University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh.

Joe McHale

Senior Research Associate

Institute for Intergovernmental Research

Mr. Joseph McHale is a senior research associate with the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR). In this capacity, he serves as the principal law enforcement advisor to the Criminal Justice Initiatives team. His responsibilities include strategic planning, training and technical assistance development and delivery, and field-centric research and planning.

Mr. McHale retired from the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department (KCPD) in 2016 at the rank of major. While serving with the KCPD, he designed and managed the largest collaborative

violence reduction effort in the KCPD's history. As the project manager for the Kansas City No Violence Alliance and the commander of the Violent Crime Enforcement Division, Mr. McHale implemented a multifaceted approach to violent crime reduction that incorporated service delivery, community engagement, and robust prosecution through strategic prosecutorial partnerships.

Mr. McHale designed and managed Kansas City's pilot focused-deterrence program, which, at the peak of its implementation, allowed Kansas City to achieve its lowest homicide rate in nearly 50 years.

Mr. McHale also commanded the KCPD's largest patrol division, with nearly 200 sworn personnel, and supervised one of the KCPD's tactical response teams (SWAT) and the Street Narcotics Unit undercover section. In addition, he was the operations supervisor for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration-led Midwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Investigative Support Center.

Upon retirement from the KCPD, Mr. McHale served as the chief of police for the Marion, Iowa, Police Department (2016 to 2019), one of the most progressive law enforcement agencies in the state of Iowa. During his tenure, Mr. McHale developed the department's first strategic plan; partnered with the University of Iowa to implement the department's first data-based patrol deployment structure; hired the department's first full-time crime analysts; and integrated crisis intervention team training, crime prevention through environmental design, and crime-free multihousing efforts.

Since 2014, Mr. McHale also has served as a subject-matter expert in support of several national programs, including the Violence Reduction Network, the National Public Safety Partnership initiative, and Michigan State University's Smart Suite Training and Technical Assistance Program. In this capacity, he is a recognized expert in social network analysis, law enforcement leadership, and community engagement. In 2016, Mr. McHale's leadership was recognized by the Jackson County, Missouri, Prosecutor with the Albert Riederer Award for Excellence in Public Safety. Mr. McHale also received the 2016 Spirit Award for dedication to the Hispanic community and the Maddie Rhodes Center.

Mr. McHale holds a bachelor's degree in administration of criminal justice from Grantham University. He also is a graduate of the Southern Police Institute's 122nd Administrative Officers Course at the University of Louisville.

Appendix B—Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Public Safety Briefing

UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE



Public Safety Review Criteria

The following criteria are evaluated to determine if a homicide or non-fatal shooting incident will be reviewed at the Public Safety Review meeting.

The Fusion Division and CIB are responsible for determining the Person/Group Evaluation and Other Evaluation categories. Each District is responsible for communicating any Place Evaluation.

Person/Group Evaluation: *(Automatically Discussed)*

- Domestic violence incident/history
- Group/gang associations currently impacting crime trends
- Habitual criminal (*consideration for Probation/Parole*)
- Individual involved in homicide or non-fatal shooting within the last 3 years
- Networks of Criminal (NOC) subject
- Romantically involved subjects
- Subject linked to a NIBIN case
- Violent Impact Program (VIP) subject

Place Evaluation: *(* = Automatically Discussed)*

- Repeat shots fired into residence *
- Repeat gun violence in area *
- School
- Problematic business/location
- After set location
- Drug dealing activity in area
- Gambling in area

Other Evaluation: *(Automatically Discussed)*

- High profile/noteworthy incident
- Retaliation likely
- Scene casings/firearms linked to a NIBIN case with solvability

Note: *If necessary, the total number of incidents to be discussed will be limited by further evaluating incidents with only a Place Evaluation.*

(U) This document has been provided to you in your official capacity by the Milwaukee Police Department Fusion Division. You are encouraged to share information contained within this communication with members of your organization who have a verified Need to Know. Further dissemination or reproduction is not permitted. Contact MPD's Fusion Division at ShootReview@milwaukee.gov or 414-935-1200 with any questions regarding handling instructions to include, but not limited to, dissemination, reproduction, retention, and destruction.

Appendix C—Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department Police Civilian Investigator Job Description



City of Phoenix

Police Civilian Investigator

The listing of duties and responsibilities shall not be held to exclude other duties not specifically mentioned that are of similar kind or level of difficulty as the essential functions of the classification. They are intended to describe the general nature and level of work being performed by individuals assigned to positions in this classification.

DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE CLASS:

The fundamental reason this classification exists is to perform a variety of tasks of a police nature in support of law enforcement activities in an investigative bureau of the Police Department. Assignments may include investigative or support responsibilities in the Drug Enforcement Bureau, Family Investigations Bureau, Property Crimes Bureau, and Violent Crimes Bureau. Duties will vary by assignment in the investigative bureau. Evaluation of performance by a Police Sergeant is made through the review of reports, observation, and discussion. Some positions require shift work on Shift I or Shift II. This is a non-sworn, unarmed position within the Police Department. This classification is distinguished from a Police Officer by the fact that the employee is not a sworn officer, does not carry a firearm, does not respond to in-progress incidents, does not have contact with suspects, and does not make arrests.

SUPERVISION RECEIVED/GIVEN:

Supervision is received from a Police Sergeant or higher classification.
This classification does not supervise others.

ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS:

- Authors original and supplemental Incident Reports, which will vary in length and content
- Conducts follow-up phone calls, emails, and in-person contacts with members of the public, law enforcement, and various investigative partners
- Collects data or information from various sources (i.e., computerized crime and traffic databases, etc.)
- Contacts other law enforcement agencies, investigative leads, probation officers, etc. for additional information, and utilizing automated systems to research criminal history and conducts background checks
- Conducts non-suspect interviews with victims, witnesses, parents/caregivers, and may monitor suspect interviews at the request of a detective or supervisor
- Authors and reviews Court Orders and Search Warrants and completes required paperwork, evidence impounds, etc.
- Creates investigative support material, such as Photographic Line-ups, Crime Bulletins, Fliers, etc.

- Drives unmarked police vehicles at the discretion of an investigative supervisor for investigative or administrative purposes
- Reviews various reports on impounded evidence for the purpose of property purges, crime analysis, pended lab results, etc.
- Assists investigative supervisors with various responsibilities in the Records Management System (RMS) to include updating case management and case management queries
- Impounds property or evidence by following Impound Procedures in Operations Orders
- Produce reports, forms, and paperwork that are used to file misdemeanor or felony charges against suspects
- Creates, updates, or maintains spreadsheets, timelines, or other digital records of large-scale or high-profile investigations
- Attends court hearings for the purpose of testifying to job duties, reports, etc.
- Assists with training of new employees in this same job classification
- Attends training classes in police methods, investigative trends, and subjects related to assigned area
- Demonstrates continuous effort to improve Police Department operations, decrease investigative turnaround times, streamline work processes, and work cooperatively and jointly to provide quality seamless customer service

REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND ABILITIES:

Knowledge of:

- Phoenix Police Department Operations Orders
- Administrative Regulations
- Personnel Rules
- Manuals for the assigned bureaus
- Statutes and ordinances relating to the assigned bureau

Ability to:

- Communicate in the English language with the public by phone or in person in a one-to-one or group setting
- Comprehend and make inferences from material written in the English language
- Produce organized thoughts using proper sentence structure, punctuation, and grammar
- Operate a variety of standard office equipment
- Move objects weighing 50 pounds or less short and long distances
- Work in a variety of weather conditions with exposure to the elements
- Remain in a sitting or standing position for extended periods of time
- Work cooperatively with a sworn supervisor, who reviews work through direct observation, reports, meetings, and results achieved
- Learn job-related material through structured lecture, reading, oral instruction, and observation. This learning takes place in an on-the-job training or classroom setting
- Produce written documents in English with clearly organized thoughts using proper sentence construction, punctuation, and grammar
- Work cooperatively and effectively with all segments of the public while remaining calm, decisive, and diplomatic in stressful situations

- Learn the geography of the City; police methods, practices, and procedures; and statutes and ordinances related to the area of assignment
- Observe or monitor objects to determine compliance with prescribed operating or safety standards
- Ability to travel across a variety of surfaces and elevations
- Work safely without presenting a direct threat to self or others
- Operate a computer utilizing a keyboard or other device

Additional Requirements:

- Due to the safety and/or security sensitive nature of this classification, individuals shall be subject to pre-employment/pre-placement alcohol, drug and/or controlled substance testing as outlined in City policy and procedures
- Some positions require the use of City vehicles on City business. Individuals must be physically capable of operating the vehicles safely, possess a valid Class C Arizona Driver's License and have an acceptable driving record
 - Use of a personal vehicle for City business will be prohibited if the employee is not authorized to drive a City vehicle or if the employee does not have personal insurance coverage
- Appointment to positions in the Police Department are subject to meeting appropriate background standards
- Some positions will require the performance of other essential functions depending upon work location, assignment, or shift

ACCEPTABLE EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING:

- High school graduate or GED equivalency
- Two years of investigative experience in law enforcement, public safety, loss prevention, crime scene management, forensics, or other relevant legal or private sector field

Appendix D—Richmond, Virginia, Police Department R.E.S.E.T. Model

Overview of the Richmond Police Department Community R.E.S.E.T. (Rapid Engagement of Support in the Event of Trauma) Model

The premise behind Community R.E.S.E.T. is to restore a community to its level of normalcy after a homicide or any traumatic event that disrupts the daily life of that neighborhood. This program has social workers respond to the area of a homicide about three days after the crime. They are clearly social workers, not the police. They are a small group and go door to door handing out brochures on services available to citizens affected by the recent violence. It is not their goal to seek information; however, many times they are aware of what information might assist the investigation and are willing to relay that information to investigators, if appropriate.

The Richmond approach illustrates a creative application of many factors discussed above: an analytically driven approach that is based on a solid foundation laid and reinforced with both the community and media and that draws on diverse resources both within and external to the police department in a victim-centered approach to investigation.

Examples of Richmond R.E.S.E.T. Door Hangers



**Richmond
Police Department**
900 East Broad Street
Richmond, VA 23219

Dear Residents
of _____,

An incident involving gunshots was
reported in your neighborhood on

_____ at _____ AM/PM

If you have **any information** about this
incident, or any other incident, please call
the confidential hotline at XXX-XXX-XXXX.

Or call XXX-XXX-XXXX if you would like to
speak with a victim/witness advocate.
They may be able to provide assistance in
a number of different ways.

Shots were Fired on Your Street and We Need YOUR Help to Make Our Neighborhoods Safe!

The Richmond Police Department is using
new technology known as **ShotSpotter**.
ShotSpotter is a gunfire detection system
that pinpoints the locations of gunfire.
This system is being used in your
community to better serve residents and
increase public safety. **But to be
successful, we need YOUR help.**

If you have any information related to this
crime, or any crime, please let someone
know.

Call confidential **ShotSpotter Hotline** at
XXX-XXX-XXXX or

Contact **Crimestoppers** at
• 1-225-344-STOP (7867) or
• go to their website
www.crimestoppersbr.com
and tell them you got a door hanger
and this is a **ShotSpotter** tip.



**Richmond
Police Department**
900 East Broad Street
Richmond, VA 23219

Dear Residents
of _____,

An incident involving gunshots was
reported in your neighborhood on

_____ at _____ AM/PM

If you have **any information** about this
incident, or any other incident, please call
the confidential hotline at XXX-XXX-XXXX.

Or call XXX-XXX-XXXX if you would like to
speak with a victim/witness advocate.
They may be able to provide assistance in
a number of different ways.

Shots were Fired on Your Street and We Need YOUR Help to Make Our Neighborhoods Safe!

The Richmond Police Department is using
new technology known as **ShotSpotter**.
ShotSpotter is a gunfire detection system
that pinpoints the locations of gunfire.
This system is being used in your
community to better serve residents and
increase public safety. **But to be
successful, we need YOUR help.**

If you have any information related to this
crime, or any crime, please let someone
know.

Call confidential **ShotSpotter Hotline** at
XXX-XXX-XXXX or

Contact **Crimestoppers** at
• 1-225-344-STOP (7867) or
• go to their website
www.crimestoppersbr.com
and tell them you got a door hanger
and this is a **ShotSpotter** tip.



**Richmond
Police Department**
900 East Broad Street
Richmond, VA 23219

Dear Residents
of _____,

An incident involving gunshots was
reported in your neighborhood on

_____ at _____ AM/PM

If you have **any information** about this
incident, or any other incident, please call
the confidential hotline at XXX-XXX-XXXX.

Or call XXX-XXX-XXXX if you would like to
speak with a victim/witness advocate.
They may be able to provide assistance in
a number of different ways.

Shots were Fired on Your Street and We Need YOUR Help to Make Our Neighborhoods Safe!

The Richmond Police Department is using
new technology known as **ShotSpotter**.
ShotSpotter is a gunfire detection system
that pinpoints the locations of gunfire.
This system is being used in your
community to better serve residents and
increase public safety. **But to be
successful, we need YOUR help.**

If you have any information related to this
crime, or any crime, please let someone
know.

Call confidential **ShotSpotter Hotline** at
XXX-XXX-XXXX or

Contact **Crimestoppers** at
• 1-225-344-STOP (7867) or
• go to their website
www.crimestoppersbr.com
and tell them you got a door hanger
and this is a **ShotSpotter** tip.

Appendix E—Training Resources

Gun Offender Interviews

- ATF San Francisco Field Division
- National Training and Technical Assistance Center, <https://bja.ojp.gov/training-technical-assistance>
- National Police Foundation, National Resource and Technical Assistance Center for Improving Law Enforcement Investigations, <https://centerforimprovinginvestigations.org/>

Homicide/Nonfatal Shooting Investigations

- PSP Training and Technical Assistance Program, <https://www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/Clearinghouse>

National Public Safety Partnership Virtual Academy

- <https://www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/academy>

Social Network Analysis

- PSP Training and Technical Assistance Program, <https://www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/Clearinghouse>
- National Training and Technical Assistance Center, <https://bja.ojp.gov/training-technical-assistance>

Appendix F—Endnotes

Endnotes

- ¹ Mankins, M., “Great Companies Obsess Over Productivity, Not Efficiency,” *Harvard Business Review*, March 1, 2017.
- ² McGarrell, E., N. Hipple, and M. O’Brien, *The Importance of Nonfatal Shooting Data to Inform Violence-Prevention Policy, Practice, and Research*, January 2019, <https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/importance-nonfatal-shooting-data-inform-violence-prevention-policy-practice>.
- ³ An Amazon “management science” search produced more than 70,000 titles.
- ⁴ Mankins, M., and E. Garton, *Time, Talent, Energy*, Harvard Business Review Press, Boston, Massachusetts, 2017.
- ⁵ During previous assessments, law enforcement staff frequently cited that Level 1 shock-trauma units significantly reduced the homicide rates of their jurisdictions. The suppressive effect of quality medical care on murder rates is more than anecdotal; “the linear correlation between distance from a trauma center and case fatality rates is obvious.” See Crandall, M., D. Sharp, E. Unger, D. Straus, K. Brasel, R. Hsia, and T. Esposito, “Trauma Deserts: Distance From a Trauma Center, Transport Times, and Mortality From Gunshot Wounds in Chicago,” *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 103, No. 6, June 2013, pp. 1103–1109, <https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301223>; and Campbell, S., M. Miller, and L. Laderman, “In New York, the Neighborhood You’re Shot in May Determine Whether You Survive,” *The Trace*, October 2019, <https://www.thetrace.org/2019/10/new-york-gun-violence-queens-trauma-centers/>.
- ⁶ Lopez, G., “Living in Violence: In Some Communities, Shootings Are a Daily Occurrence,” *The Morning*, June 16, 2022, *The New York Times*, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/briefing/gun-violence-shootings-chicago.html?campaign_id=9&emc=edit_nn_20220708&instance_id=66076&nl=the-morning®i_id=37542264&segment_id=97926&te=1&user_id=1e266fa3a5c82432b9be809248d6fc50.
- ⁷ Spelman, W., and J. Eck, “Sitting Ducks, Ravenous Wolves, and Helping Hands: New Approaches to Urban Policing,” *Public Affairs Comment*, Vol. 35, No. 2, Winter 1989, pp. 1–9, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258200895_Sitting_Ducks_Ravenous_Wolves_and_Helping_Hands_New_Approaches_to_Urban_Policing.
- ⁸ Heaton, P., *Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime Research Can Tell Us About Investing in Police*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2010, https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP279.html.
- ⁹ Irvin-Erickson, Y., B. Bai, A. Gurvis, and E. Mohr, *The Effect of Gun Violence on Local Communities: Gun Violence, Business, and Employment Trends in Minneapolis, Oakland, and Washington, DC*, Urban Institute, November 2016, <http://www.urban.org/research/publication/effect-gun-violence-local-economies>.
- ¹⁰ See Howell, E. M., and P. Abraham, *The Hospital Costs of Firearm Assaults*, Urban Institute, September 2013, <http://www.urban.org/research/publication/hospital-costs-firearm-assaults>.
- ¹¹ See Bansal, D., *Initial Hospital Costs for Gunshot Wounds Just the Tip of the Iceberg*, Stanford Medicine, 2017, <http://med.stanford.edu/news/all-news/2017/03/initial-hospital-costs-from-gunshot-wounds-total-6-billion-over-nine-years.html>.

- ¹² See Scott, M., *Focused Deterrence of High-Risk Individuals*, Strategies for Policing Innovation Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Response Guide Series No. 13, Smart Policing Initiative, 2017, <https://www.smart-policing.com/tta/spotlight-reports/focused-deterrence-high-risk-individuals-pop-guide>.
- ¹³ Carter, D. L., *Homicide Process Mapping: Best Practices for Increasing Homicide Clearance*, <https://www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/Clearinghouse/Resource/175/Homicide-Process-Mapping--Best-Practices-For-Increasing-Homicide-Clearances>.
- ¹⁴ Stack, M., and M. Gartland, "Path Creation, Path Dependency, and Alternative Theories of the Firm," *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2003, p. 487, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00213624.2003.1150659713>.
- ¹⁵ See Braga, A., and D. Dusseault, "Boston, Massachusetts, Strategies for Policing Innovation II—Improving Homicide Clearance Rates: The Value of Analysis to Guide Investments in Investigative Policies and Practices," Strategies for Policing Innovation Spotlight Report, 2017, <https://www.smart-policing.com/tta/spotlight-reports/boston-ma-site-spotlight-phase-ii>.
- ¹⁶ *Program Profile: Rockford (Il.) Area Violence Elimination Network (RAVEN)*, Crime Solutions, National Institute of Justice, Washington, D.C., 2022, https://crimesolutions.ojp.gov/ratedprograms/766?utm_campaign=csreleases&utm_content=default&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery.
- ¹⁷ See *Focused Deterrence of High-Risk Individuals*, <https://www.smart-policing.com/tta/spotlight-reports/focused-deterrence-high-risk-individuals-pop-guide>; and *Focused Deterrence in Depth*, RAND Corporation Better Policing Toolkit, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL261/better-policing-toolkit/all-strategies/focused-deterrence/in-depth.html>.
- ¹⁸ See Kofas et al., 2006, *Project Safe Neighborhoods: Strategic interventions—Crime Incident Reviews*, https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/Crime_Incident_Reviews.pdf; Hipple et al., 2016, *Gun Crime Incident Reviews as a Strategy for Enhancing Problem Solving and Information Sharing*, <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/gun-crime-incident-reviews-strategy-enhancing-problem-solving-and>; Hipple et al., 2019, *The Case for Studying Criminal Nonfatal Shootings: Evidence From Four Midwestern Cities*, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/24751979.2019.1689152?journalCode=rjej20>.
- ¹⁹ See Braga, A., D. Weisburd, and B. Turchan, "Focused Deterrence Strategies and Crime Control: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence," *Criminology and Public Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2018, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1745-9133.12353/pdf>.
- ²⁰ See *Focused Deterrence in Depth*, Better Policing Toolkit, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL261/better-policing-toolkit/all-strategies/focused-deterrence/in-depth.html>.
- ²¹ See Clarke, R., and D. Weisburd, "Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse of Displacement," in R. V. Clarke (ed.), *Crime Prevention Studies*, Criminal Justice Press, Monsey, New York, 1994, pp. 165–182, http://www.popcenter.org/library/crime-prevention/volume_02/08clarke.pdf.

²² See the Urban Institute's *Responding to Homicide and Shooting Scenes: A Review of Procedural Justice Practice in the U.S.*, <https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/justice-policy-center/projects/procedural-justice-homicide-and-shooting-scene-response>.

²³ See *Responding to Homicide and Shooting Scenes*, <https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/justice-policy-center/projects/procedural-justice-homicide-and-shooting-scene-response>.

²⁴ Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan, "Focused Deterrence Strategies and Crime Control," <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1745-9133.12353>.

²⁵ *An Overview: Community Violence Intervention Strategies*, National Criminal Justice Association, 2021, <https://bja.ojp.gov/library/publications/overview-community-violence-intervention-strategies>.

²⁶ *Focused Deterrence in Depth*, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL261/better-policing-toolkit/all-strategies/focused-deterrence/in-depth.html>.



STAFF REPORT TO THE ANTIOCH POLICE OVERSIGHT COMMISSION

DATE: Regular Meeting of May 19, 2025

TO: Honorable Chairperson and Members of the Antioch Police Oversight Commission

SUBMITTED BY: Bessie Marie Scott, City Manager *BMS*

SUBJECT: Discussion on the Selection of Two Future Commission Meeting Dates to Conduct Two Commission Meetings at a Location Other than City Hall

RECOMMENDED ACTION

It is recommended that the Antioch Police Oversight Commission discuss and select two future Commission meeting dates to conduct two Commission meetings at a location(s) other than City Hall.

FISCAL IMPACT

The fiscal impact is yet to be determined and will depend on the direction provided.

DISCUSSION

According to Ordinance No. 2212-C-S that created the Antioch Police Oversight Commission ("APOC"), section 4-3.106 (B) states at least two APOC meetings shall be held at location(s) within the City of Antioch other than City Hall. The purpose of having meetings at a location(s) outside of City Hall is to increase community engagement.

The Ordinance states the APOC shall make a good faith effort to hold these meetings at public schools, youth centers, or community-based organizations within the city. City-owned facilities that are available and have the ability to accommodate the public are the Nick Rodriguez Community Center in downtown Antioch and the Antioch Community Center located on Lone Tree Way across from Deer Valley High School.

The future 2025 APOC meeting dates are as follows:

- June 2nd
- June 16th
- July 21st
(One meeting due to Summer Break)
- August 4th
- August 18th
- September 1st (Holiday)
- September 15th
- October 6th
- October 20th
- November 3rd
- November 17th
- December 1st or 15th
(One meeting due to Winter Break)

ATTACHMENT

None